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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
the proverbial "bible" of mental illness, is at a unique point in its history
and evolution. DSM diagnoses, designed with clinical uses in mind, have
become ubiquitous across a broad range of settings, ranging from
legislative statutes to civil commitment hearings for sexually violent
predators to special education eligibility litigation. Despite the ubiquity of
the manual's categories, the American Psychiatric Association ("APA"),
the professional organization in charge of the manual's revisions and
publication, has resisted the influence of these "impure aims," arguing that
revisions ought to be guided by scientific concerns about the validity and
clinical utility of the constructs rather than concerns about social service
eligibility, civil rights endangerment, and treatment reimbursement.
In this article, I challenge the APA's resistance to pragmatic
considerations. To do so, I offer a historical and sociological review of the
way that these pragmatic considerations did and do influence the manual.
Part I outlines the history and evolution of the DSM's categories, showing
how pragmatic concems-pressure from third-party payers for a more
standardized set of efficacy data; cultural critiques of psychiatry's
"pathologization" of deviance; the serendipitous discovery of
antipsychotics-have influenced the DSM at various junctures. These
pragmatic concerns led to a major shift between the first two editions of
the DSM, manuals that were peripheral in both cultural discussions of
mental illness and in clinical practice, and 1980s DSM-III, after which the
DSM became a central locus of debate about mental illness and its social,
legal, and economic impacts. The history of the DSM shows the way that
these "impure" concerns inevitably pervade and shape the manual, despite
the manual's disclaimers about its narrow scope and narrow influence.
Part II surveys the interests at stake in DSM categories and how these
interests can come into conflict. For example, patients may be interested in
broad and inclusive diagnostic criteria that facilitate insurance
reimbursement; clinicians may be interested in criteria that not only aid in
treatment but are simple enough to not add large administrative burdens in
time-pressed environments; basic science researchers may find the DSM
categories too broad for investigations into the genetic bases of various
mental illnesses, while epidemiological researchers may have a stronger
interest in categories that are consistent between manuals to better track
prevalence rates. This panoply of interests raises questions of which
interests are legitimate versus illegitimate, which are important versus
marginal, and how the APA can mediate between the manual's uses across
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these many contexts. Highlighting one clash between stakeholder interests,
Part III focuses on proposed changes to the autism diagnostic categories in
the DSM-5 and highlights how the DSM diagnoses stand at the nexus
between diverse stakeholders with divergent aims. I highlight three clashes
of stakeholders in the DSM autism category: parents and school districts,
parents and insurers, and parents and children. Despite the undeniable
presence of these clashes, the APA has attempted to distance itself from
these "pragmatic" clashes and downplay concerns about the ramifications
of the changes.
While the aim of this article is largely descriptive-outlining and
articulating the many neglected interests with a stake in DSM categories-
Part IV ventures into prescriptive territory. I make two suggestions about
how the DSM can acknowledge the "impurity" of its categories. First is
creating more heterogeneous Work Groups for revisions, especially for
diagnoses such as developmental or sexual disorders where special
education and legal proceedings greatly impact a sufferer's life trajectory.
Second is greater publicity about the DSM's long-term aims; while it may
be tempting from a social service standpoint to ensure that no one "loses"
service eligibility, changes to diagnoses may have long-term benefits that




There is nothing God-given or immutable about the [DSM]
categories and definitions of their official nosology.
Debates rage between religious fundamentalists and theological
liberals about how to view the Bible: is it handed down by a perfect God to
a public who should not challenge its authority or "purity"? Or is the Bible
a socially constructed document, written by various authors guided by
specific intellectual orientations and social purposes? As many have noted,
the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) has become the proverbial "bible" of
mental illness. While most scholars of religious studies agree that the
Christian Bible is a collection of writings shaped by an .array of social,
political, intellectual, and other considerations, these dimensions of the
DSM, a modem metaphorical bible, remain underexplored. The manual is
often conceived as a tool used purely for the purpose of clinical and
scientific practice and guided by apolitical science alone. For example,
Theodore Millon, a psychiatrist and member of the DSM-III task force,
criticized interest groups such as gay rights activists or psychoanalytic
theorists for attempting to thwart the courageous, scientific effort to
significantly revise DSM diagnostic categories.2 In this view, science
engages in a battle with nefarious societal stakeholders-patient activists,
legal professionals, third-party payers-whose stakes in the manual's
diagnostic categories exert an impure influence on the text.
The APA task force contends that its first priority in developing the
DSM is "Clinical utility: make sure the manual is useful to those who
diagnose and treat patients with mental illness, and to the patients being
treated."3 In this article, I parse apart this broad and imprecise definition of
"utility" to examine whether and how the DSM should take the social and
legal uses of its categories into account. Patient utility may depend on
whether a treatment is reimbursed by insurance, whether the diagnosis can
help the patient gain social services, whether the DSM constructs are
useful to researchers investigating the etiology of a given disorder, how
the diagnosis affects one's standing in a court of law, and a host of other
1. Robert Kendell, The Relationship Between DSM-IV and lCD-10, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 297, 300
(1991).
2. Theodore Millon, The DSM-III: An Insider's Perspective, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 804, 807 (1983).
3. DSM-5 Development: Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N (2012), available at
http://www.DSM5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx.
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non-clinical factors. Should the developers of the DSM broaden their
definition of the manual's utility and consider the way it is used in these
"impure," non-clinical contexts? Should they incorporate sensitivity to
these contexts in the manual's revisions? In this paper, I address these
questions, a crucial task due to the manual's impact across these diverse
settings, the recent May 2013 publication of the manual's 5th edition,' and
the APA's commitment to more public transparency and involvement in
subsequent revisions of the DSM.
In Part I, I briefly review the history of the DSM, focusing on various
social, economic, and intellectual forces that have shaped the inception
and evolution of the manual over the past 60 years. This historical review
is important in highlighting the way that "impure influences"-critiques of
psychiatry's credibility, pressure from third party-payers to develop a
more standardized system of clinical diagnosis, worries about the
misinterpretation of DSM categories in legal sentencing-have influenced
the manual at various junctures. Part II outlines the stakeholders in the
DSM, discussing both explicit audiences of the manual-clinicians,
researchers, patients and their families-and those who use the manual in
contexts for which it is specifically not designed-school districts in
determining special education benefits, the judicial system, insurance
companies, and pharmaceutical manufacturers; the section outlines
divergence and convergence between the interests of these diverse
stakeholders. Part III is a case study of one specific debate between
different stakeholders with divergent aims: proposed changes to the autism
spectrum disorders diagnostic category in the DSM-5. In Part IV, I suggest
two improvements for the DSM development process that can help the
manual incorporate, or at least remain sensitive to, the array of stakeholder
interests that operate across a multiplicity of clinical and non-clinical
contexts.
The aim of this article is to show the way in which the DSM's
official, "pure" aims of improving patient's clinical outcomes are
dependent upon the many "impure," non-clinical factors that influence
patient wellbeing: basic science research, the legal standing of the
mentally ill, third party payers' trust that a given diagnosis warrants
treatment reimbursement, and eligibility for federal and state-provided
social services. Ultimately, I argue that although the task force's main
priority should be the construction of useful clinical categories, a more
4. This paper was submitted and revised in the months preceding the DSM-5's May 17a, 2013 publication
date. Therefore, it does not directly address the final outcomes of the manual's revisions. However, the
paper does address public responses to certain proposed revisions that occurred in the two years leading up
to the DSM-5's May 2013 publication.
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explicit sensitivity during the DSM development process to the different
contexts in which the manual is used can be a natural extension of the
APA's normative aims and goals.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DSM AND ITS SOCIETAL
STAKEHOLDERS
The DSM's history illustrates that debates over how we ought to
diagnose and classify mental illness have often been inextricably
influenced by a broad array of societal stakeholders-insurance
companies, cultural critics, philosophers of science, and the public at
large-rather than psychiatrists and clinical psychologists alone.
Furthermore, within the psychiatric community, intellectual and
professional rivalries have profoundly shaped the prevailing psychiatric
paradigm at the time. In the first section, I will explore the way in which
two competing schools of thought-the Kraepelinians and the Freudians-
battled for influence in early to mid-20th century psychiatry. The second
section will explore the way in which World War II and the
"normalization" of mental illness led to a need for a more comprehensive
system of psychiatric classification. The crisis of legitimacy within
psychiatry and consequent paradigm shift in the DSM III is the focus of
the third section, as a confluence of social, scientific, and economic
forces-scientific studies undermining the field's reliability, the
serendipitous discovery of pharmacological therapies, cultural criticisms
of psychiatry, the rise of third-party payers and insurance
reimbursement-contributed to undermine public confidence in psychiatry
as a profession. I argue that psychiatry then attempted to regain this
confidence through a dramatic revision to psychiatric classification. The
last section will explore influences on the manual since the DSM-III-the
unprecedented success of the DSM as the "standard" manual across an
array of contexts, the rise of managed care and other economic constraints
on mental health treatment, challenges to the DSM's approach emerging
from clinical care and neuroscience and genetics research, and the growing
influence of disease-specific patient advocacy groups.
A. Before the DSM-I: Two European Schools of Thought
Two European scientists, Emil Kraepelin (c. 1856 - 1923) and
Sigmund Freud (c. 1856 - 1939), created theoretical paradigms of mental
illness that greatly influenced later DSMs. Kraepelin, a German professor
and researcher, was focused on the classification, categorization, and
description of psychiatric disorders. He insisted that psychiatric
2013] 153
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disturbances be treated as medical diseases and categorized as distinct
entities with definable symptoms and prognosis.' Adolf Meyer, a leading
intellectual figure in early 2 0th century American psychiatry, transmitted
these ideas to the American psychiatric context as a way for psychiatry to
establish the appearance of rigor with a more precise system of
classification and to establish its place among other branches of medicine
that were increasingly focused on characterizing more precise disease
entities. 6
However, this approach to systematic classification began to fall out
of favor as the century proceeded. Meyer himself, for example, began to
argue that Kraepelin's approach to diagnostic classification was less
helpful for helping patients improve than a closer examination of the
individual patient, his or her unique situation, and the patient's reaction to
his or her unique life situation.' As one commentator summarizes this shift
in thinking that led psychiatrists to question the need for psychiatric labels,
"unique circumstances were not generalizable, hence diagnostic labels. .
.yielded partial insights at best."' This de-emphasis on a precise
classification scheme for mental illness in favor of a new emphasis on a
patient's unique life history and reactions to life situations paved the way
for the ascendance of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches to
psychiatry, approaches exemplified by two of Kraepelin's intellectual
rivals-Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung-whose influence on American
psychiatric diagnosis eclipsed that of Kraepelin by the 1930s and 1940s.9
5. See generally RICHARD NOLL, AMERICAN MADNESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF DEMENTIA PRAECOX
(2011) (discussing the ascendance of Kraepelin's ideas about discrete mental illness disease categories in
America at the beginning of the 2 0 1h century).
6. Id. at 281 (describing how medicine in the late 19th century began to focus on standard and precise
systems of disease classification that could be applied across patients regardless of a patient's unique life
trajectory. Psychiatry, in order to maintain its standing as a branch of medicine, also needed to take the
same approach to classification).
7. Id. at 167-168 (discussing how Meyer began to critique Kraeplein's approach to disease classification,
viewing these methods as a form of "artificial abstraction" that "smothered the richness of the experiential
details of an individual life." His case history approach to diagnosis "located the roots of insanity in the
unique life circumstances of the individual.").
8. Id. at 175.
9. See generally Dawn Bruijnzeel & Rajiv Tandon, The Concept of Schizophrenia: From the 1850s to the
DSM-5, 41 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 289, 289 (2011) (arguing that from the end of World War II to the mid-
1970s, American psychiatry adopted a model of mental disorders as conflicts of personality and
intrapsychic conflict that was informed by Freud's "psychodynamic paradigms" of mental disorders and
psychoanalytic thinking). See also JOHN BURNHAM, AFTER FREUD LEFT: A CENTURY OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS IN AMERICA 4, 6 (2012) (arguing that the period from the 1940s to the 1960s was the
"high point" of psychoanalytic thinking in American psychiatry and that evidence of Freud's legacy in
American psychiatric thought at this time is overwhelming); NOLL, supra note 5, at 276 (describing the
"monotheistic reign of the Freudians" within American psychiatry from the 1940s to the 1970s).
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Freud and his prot6g6, Carl Jung, developed a very different approach
to the study of psychiatric disturbance. Eschewing systems of sharp
classification and the conceptualization of mental disorders as discrete
entities, Freud focused on the etiology of mental disorders and the way in
which stressful experiences, especially in childhood, influence one's
psychological and emotional development.o The psychoanalysts and
psychodynamic theories of psychiatric disturbance came to dominate
American psychiatry from the 1930s to the 1960s-1970s."
B. DSM-I and DSM-II: World War II and Psychodynamic
Continuity
World Wars I and II reinforced the ascendance of these
psychodynamic theories by reinforcing their depiction of inner turmoil
interacting with external stress to produce psychiatric disturbance. World
War I introduced the concept of "shell shock" into common parlance and
highlighted a large number of soldiers suffering from both mild and severe
psychiatric distress after their wartime experience.1 2 The war underscored
that environmental stressors could have a profound impact on
psychological functioning, and led to the conceptualization of a spectrum
between mental illness and mental health rather than a sharp dichotomy
between the two." World War II further blurred these boundaries, and was
accompanied by a proliferation of mental health service settings: the
Veterans Health administration provided care to returning soldiers and the
newly-created National Institutes of Mental Health ("NIMH") provided
government support to more practitioners.14
Unsurprisingly given American psychiatry's explicit marginalization
of psychiatric classification, the two existing systems of psychiatric
classification at the time-the APA's Standard Classified Nomenclature of
Disease and the most recent version of the International Classification of
Diseases (ICD), the ICD-6-were inadequate for describing the broad
10. Rick Mayes & Allen V. Horwitz, DSM-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness,
41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 249, 260 (2005).
11. Id. at 260.
12. See IAN DOWBIGGIN, THE QUEST FOR MENTAL HEALTH: A TALE OF SCIENCE, MEDICINE, SCANDAL,
SORROW, AND MASS SOCIETY 96-97 (2011) (describing how "shell shock" was embedded in popular usage
following World War II for the trauma experienced by soldiers).
13. Id at 98-99. See also Gerald N. Grob, Origins of the DSM-I: A Study in Appearance and Reality, 148
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 427 (1991) (discussing how the war contributed to the idea that the stress associated
with combat contributed to mental maladjustment).
14. RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER BUT NOT WELL: MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1950. 80 (2006).
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range of psychiatric disturbance that veterans exhibited."5 Psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists rushed to develop more comprehensive descriptions
of the broad array of post-war psychopathology." In this sense, the first
edition of the DSM was not prompted by a purely scientific need for a
more standardized system of classification but by a social and clinical
concern in the influx of veterans with psychiatric distress whose
disturbances were not fully described in existing psychiatric nomenclature.
These concerns resulted in the quick development and publication of
the American Psychiatric Association's (APA's) DSM-I, published in
1952 after a one-year development process by an appointed Work Group."
The APA's Work Group -the Committee on Nomenclature and
Statistics-solicited some feedback on the manual upon sending a draft of
the manual to 10% of practicing psychiatrists, with 241 of those
psychiatrists returning questionnaires to provide comments on the
categories.'" Yet as I will discuss later, this closed-doors process,
conducted by psychiatric experts with little to no input from patients and
their families, stands in stark contrast to the DSM-5's process of public
input and engagement.19
The first edition of the DSM was heavily influenced by the
psychodynamic theories that described disorders not in terms of
observable symptoms but in terms of conflicts between biological drives
and external pressures.2 0 The DSM-II, published in 1968, both took longer
15. See Mitchell Wilson, DSM-III and the Transformation ofAmerican Psychiatry: A History, 150 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY, 399, 401 (1993); Thomas A. Widiger et al., Toward an Empirical Classification for the
DSM-IV, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 280, 281 (1991); See also Atwood Gaines, From DSM-I to III-R:
Voices of Self Mastery, and the Other: A Cultural Constructivist Reading of U.S. Psychiatric
Classification, 35 SOC., SCI. & MED., 3, 7 (1992).
16. See Gaines, supra note 15, at 7-8.
17. STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF THE DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN
PSYCHIATRY 27 (1992).
18. Widiger, supra note 15, at 281.
19. The APA has posted all potential revisions to a public website and proposed changes to diagnostic
criteria have been debated and parsed apart in the popular media. For the public website at which DSM
revisions were posted, see American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5 Development, at
http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx. For a brief sample of the media debate about DSM changes, see,
e.g., Paula Span, Grief After New Depression Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013), at
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/grief-over-new-depression-diagnosis/; Greg Jaffe, New
Name for PTSD Could Mean Less Stigma, WASH. POST (May 5, 2012) at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-name-for-ptsd-could-mean-less-stigma
/2012/05/05/glQAlV8M4T-story.html; John Cloud, Redefining Crazy: Researchers Revise the DSM, TIME
(Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1884092,00.html; Erin
Allday, Revision of Psychiatric Manual Under Fire, S.F. CHRONICLE (Nov. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Revision-of-psychiatric-manual-under-fire-2295555.php.
20. Grob, supra note 13, at 429; See also Wilson M. Compton & Samuel B. Guze, The Neo-Kraepelinian
Revolution in Psychiatric Diagnosis, 245 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE, 196,
198 (1995) (describing how the disorders were called "reactions" which may have been largely shaped by
psychiatrists' experiences with stress-related cases after World War II).
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to create-three years compared to one-and featured an expanded
number of diagnoses: 182 compared to the DSM-I's 106.21 Despite this
expanded gestation and expanded list of diagnoses, the DSM-II reflected
the same theoretical spirit as the first edition, casting symptoms as
reflections of underlying intra-psychic conflicts or stressful life conditions.
Both the DSM-I and DSM-II eschewed elaborate, symptom-based
classification schemes, arguing that symptoms "did not reveal disease
entities but disguised underlying conflicts."22 As a result of the theoretical
orientation of psychodynamic theory-symptoms and diagnoses mattered
much less than an in-depth exploration of a patient's unique life history-
the first two editions of the DSM, by many accounts, were seldom used.23
The manual itself remained somewhat peripheral to both discussions
within the psychiatric community and to discussions in broader culture
about the nature of mental illness. 24 When the psychiatric profession
became engulfed in a crisis of legitimacy, however, the manual and the
diagnoses it had constructed came under increased scrutiny. In turn, this
social, political, and intellectual scrutiny led to a dramatic shift in the way
mental illness was classified.
C. DSM-III: The Copernican Revolution of Classification
The scrutiny that contributed to psychiatry's crisis of legitimacy can
be traced to five sources discussed below and that spanned from the early
1950s to the early 1970s: (1) research studies that undermined the
perceived effectiveness of the professions of psychiatry and psychology,
(2) the rise of effective pharmacological interventions whose development
had little connection to theories of psychiatric disturbance, (3) cultural
critiques of psychiatry's standing as a medical profession, (4) the rise of
third-party insurance coverage of psychotherapy, and (5) the inhumane
conditions of certain inpatient institutions. The diversity of these critiques
illustrates the way in which the DSM's concerns permeate beyond the
clinical context, engaging a variety of stakeholders who exerted an
"impure" influence upon the DSM categories leading up to the major 1980
revision of the manual.
21. DOWBIGGIN, supra note 12, at 175.
22. Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 10, at 250.
23. Id. at 250.
24. Wilson, supra note 15, at 401.
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1. Critique One: Are Psychiatrists and Clinical Psychologists
Superfluous?
Two studies were particularly damaging to the reputation of
psychiatry and clinical psychology in the period from the 1950s to the
1970s. In 1952, Hans Eysenck reviewed twenty-four studies of
psychodynamic and eclectic psychotherapy and found that psychotherapy
was no more effective than no treatment at all.25 Even if psychotherapy's
effectiveness was challenged by Eysenck, perhaps clinicians still possessed
better than average skill of discerning a patient's prognosis and best course
of treatment? Paul Meehl challenged psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists' claims to the legitimacy of their clinical judgment with a
"disturbing little book" published in 1954.26 Meehl's book claimed that
statistical prediction-the use of an actuarial formula based on inputted
information-outperformed clinical prediction, which involves the use of
clinical skill, intuition, and flexibility, in predicting outcomes such as
which treatment best benefits a mentally ill person.27
2. Critique Two: Pharmacology Developed by Serendipity Rather
Than Theory
The rise of effective anti-psychotics augmented these critiques of
clinical judgment. The anti-psychotic Thorazine (chlorprozamine) was
first introduced in 1955; in 1960, the first large-scale, double-blinded,
placebo-controlled clinical trial showing the antipsychotic's efficacy was
published.28 Thorazine began to replace ineffective (and often inhumane)
treatments such as lobotomies, insulin therapy, and electric shock
treatment. 2 The medication's use was also eventually codified into
manuals shaping clinical practice: while the 1959 Handbook of American
25. Hans J. Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy: An Evaluation, 16 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 319-24 (1952). See also BRUCE E. WAMPOLD, THE GREAT PSYCHOTHERAPY DEBATE: MODELS,
METHODS, AND FINDINGS 62 (2010) (discussing the questionable reliability of Eysenck's literature review,
such as the data being culled from two separate patient pools and the lack of a control group).
26. PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (1954). See also Drew Westen & Joel Weinberger, When Clinical Description
becomes Statistical Prediction, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595, 595 (2004); Drew Westen & Joel Weinberger,
In Praise of Clinical Judgment: Meehl's Forgotten Legacy, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1257, 1266 (2005).
27. MEEHL, supra note 26, at 22.
28. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing the success of Thorazine and how that success
spawned other neuroleptics in the 1960s and 1970s).
29. See Benjamin Pollack, Preliminary Report on 500 Patients Treated with Thorazine at Rochester State
Hospital, 29 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY, 439, 439, 444 (1955) (describing Thorazine use in patients with
"mental deficiency," "psychoneurosis," and "manic depressive psychosis." As Pollack describes,
"lobotomies have been indefinitely deferred for some patients because of the marked improvement in them
following treatment with Thorazine . . . these patients had previously been treated with insulin, electric
shock, or other types of therapy-with temporary, slight, or no results.").
158
THE DSMATA CROSSROADS
Psychiatry argued that psychotherapy ought to be the "treatment of
choice" for practicing psychiatrists, the 1967 Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry described antipsychotic therapies as breakthrough treatments.30
Thorazine did not undermine the first two editions of DSM and its
categories by itself, but the success of the medication contributed to a
growing critique of psychoanalytic methods of treatment and the
psychoanalytic influence on DSM categories." Thorazine had been an
anti-histamine treatment until French psychiatrists repurposed it;
meanwhile, Indian physicians had used the tranquilizer reserpine for
hundreds of years." What credibility did the profession and its categories
have when other disciplines and researchers, divorced from psychoanalytic
theory, had "invented" effective therapies for its conditions? Though
pharmacologic interventions did not fully supplant psychotherapeutic
ones, these medications were weapons added to the arsenal directed
against the profession's legitimacy.
3. Critique Three: Psychiatry as a "Coercive" Labeler of Societal
Deviance
While one could call the ascendance of antipsychotics a "pure"
influence on the DSM-a "revolution" in psychiatric treatment that had
the backing of some of psychiatry's leading proponents"-many "impure"
voices of either non-psychiatrists or former psychiatrists who explicitly
disavowed their affiliation with the profession also challenged the manual
at the time. A wave of cultural criticism engulfed the field of psychiatry in
the 1960s and 70s. French philosopher Michel Foucault critiqued mental
institutions as perpetuating power arrangements and pathologizing
nonconformity; the book and film One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest
depicted psychiatrists as "mental police" and inpatient treatment as a
horrific prison;34 a former psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, Thomas Szasz,
published The Myth of Mental Illness, which argued that mental illness is
30. FRANK & GLIED, supra note 14, at 30.
31. A survey of medical residents in psychiatry points to the growing dissatisfaction with psychoanalytic
theories and methods in the 1960s and 70s. Few in the 1950s doubted the importance of psychoanalysis and
by 1975, only 45% of psychiatric residents rated psychoanalysis as an important tool. Many valued
experience in pharmacotherapy more highly than training in psychoanalysis. See Robin M. Murray, A
Reappraisal ofAmerican Psychiatry, 313 LANCET 255, 255 (1979).
32. Linford Rees, Indications for the Use of Drugs in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, 39
POSTGRAD. MED. J. 48, 48 (1963).
33. As one psychiatrist describes, "during the past decade [1950-1960], the drug treatment of psychiatric
illness has advanced with remarkable rapidity... the discovery of new drugs has revolutionized psychiatric
treatment." Id. at 48-52.
34. Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 10, at 252.
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determined by social and ethical, rather than medical, criteria." Whether or
not these cultural critiques were legitimate, they were a highly public
assault on the credibility of the psychiatric profession. David Rosenhan's
1973 study "On Being Sane in Insane Places," in which actors posing as
patients had difficulty convincing professionals at a psychiatric hospital
that they were "normal" and should be released, further buttressed the
cultural critique of psychiatry. Psychiatrists, in this view, were not only
useless at identifying mental illness and improving patient outcomes, but
also caused harm by conflating deviation from prevailing social norms
with psychiatric disturbance.
4. Critique Four: The Bottomless Pit of Ineffective Treatment
Perhaps more influential than these cultural and within-discipline
critiques was the change in insurance coverage of psychiatric treatment in
the 1960s and 70s.; While many patients in the 1950s paid for
psychotherapy completely out of pocket, by the 1960s, private insurance
began to partially reimburse psychotherapy.37 The creation of Medicaid
under the 1965 Social Security Amendments led to another means of
paying for psychotherapy and accompanying demand for efficacy data to
justify those payments. In the 1970s, more than a dozen states, exasperated
by the tight restrictions that many private insurers placed on mental health
treatment coverage and the burden these restrictions placed on the public
mental health system, created laws requiring certain insurers to cover
mental health services. Psychotherapy, judged against treatments for
other diseases, faced increased scrutiny about the diagnostic criteria
guiding its treatments, the lack of uniformity across different therapists,
and whether therapy led to cost-worthy outcomes for patients." The
Medical Director of the APA at the time, Melvin Sabshin, recalls that
private insurance companies and the federal government began to view
35. THOMAS SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1974); See also Jonathan Y. Tsou, The Importance
of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification, 5 J. PHIL.
HIST. 445, 445-69 (2011).
36. David Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SC. 250, 250-258 (1973).
37. Nancy Tomes, The Development of Clinical Psychology, Social Work, and Psychiatric Nursing: 1900s
- 1980s, in HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY AND MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 657, 673 (Edwin R. Wallace & John
Gach eds., 2008).; See also Cynthia Smith, Retail Prescription Drug Spending in the National Health
Accounts, 23 HEALTH AFF. 160, 163 (2004).
38. Richard Frank, Chris Koyanagi, & Thomas G. McGuire, The Politics and Economics of Mental Health
'Parity' Laws, 16 HEALTH AFF. 108, 112 (1997).
39. See ALLAN HORWITZ, CREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 185 (2002) (discussing how the "the rise of third-
party payers contributed to pressures to change the dynamic model: the continua and symbolic mechanisms




psychiatry as a "'bottomless pit-a voracious consumer-of resources and
insurance dollars-because its methods of assessment and treatment were
too fluid and unstandardized."40
5. Critique Five: The Inhumane Conditions of Inpatient
Institutions
While insurers place pressure upon psychiatrists as a profession to
justify the effectiveness and reimbursement-worthiness of the treatments
they provided, other stakeholders at the time had a very different critique
of psychiatry's methods of treatment. Sociologist Erving Goffman's
Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other
Inmates, published in 1961, presented a critique of inpatient mental
hospitals as "total institutions" that deprived their patients not only of their
freedom but also of their sense of self; the book asserted that the mental
patient is "led into a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations" that
cuts off his or her family, occupational, and educational interests.4 In line
with the anti-psychiatry tenor of the time, not only cast the psychiatric
profession as ineffective at treating mental illness, but also implied that
psychiatry's treatment methods, especially ones involving inpatient
treatment, were inhumane and degrading towards patients. Goffman's
critique of inpatient mental institutions had a more far-reaching impact on
perceptions of psychiatry than critiques such as those of Szasz.42 The
impact of Goffman's critique was bolstered by newspaper exposes and
public commissions argued that the conditions of these institutions were
inhumane and deplorable; mental hospitals were "dehumanizing
'warehouses'-'snake pits"' where persons were "neglected or abused."43
These critical appraisals of inpatient psychiatric institutions contributed to
a shift in the provision of mental illness services of deinstitutionalization,"
where persons from mental health institutions were released into the
40. Wilson, supra note 15, at 403.
41. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES 14 (1961).
42. See Marcelo T. Berlim, Marcelo P.A. Fleck, and Edward Shorter, Notes on Antipsychiatry, 253 EUR.
ARCH. PSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCI. 61, 65 (2003) (arguing that although figures such as Thomas Szasz,
the author of the Myth ofMental Illness, became "cult figures for the radical left in the late 1960s," he did
not have much influence on "psychiatrists or on Health Department policies." In contrast, the authors argue
that Goffman "provided convincing arguments that mental hospitals were not merely profoundly anti-
therapeutic institutions in practice but were almost bound to be so because of the profound power gulf
between patients and staff, and the latters' total control over the lives of the former. He therefore provided
Health Departments and taxpayers with a justification for closing large numbers of expensive hospitals.")
43. Howard H. Goldman and Joseph P. Morrissey, The Alchemy of Mental Health Policy: Homelessness
and the Fourth Cycle ofReform, 75 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 727, 728 (1985).
44. See Rajendra Persaud, Home Street Home, 306 BMJ 726, 726 (arguing that Goffman's Asylums was a
"major impetus" behind the deinstitutionalization movement).
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community to seek our care from other sources.4 5 But I argue that the
critique also contributed to the growing tide of cultural criticism of
psychiatry, its means of diagnosis, and its methods of treatment for those
labeled with a mental illness.
6. The result: a renewed attention to "objective" psychiatric
classification
These mounting pressures-medical, cultural, and economic-
incrementally accumulated over the period of time spanning from the
1950s to 1970s to strongly undermine the scientific and professional
legitimacy of the profession of psychiatry. I contend that the profession of
psychiatry then focused on the DSM revision process as a tool for
regaining its legitimacy among heretic psychiatrists, the critical
sociologists, the skeptical third-party payers, and the concerned public at
large who launched these critiques. The means by which psychiatry tried
to regain its legitimacy was a paradigm shift in the creation of 1980s
DSM-III.
With pharmacological interventions that required little
psychoanalytic training becoming popular, Freudian theories falling out of
favor, and an insurance industry seeking treatment methods with a broader
corpus of scientific backing, psychiatry needed to prove that its diagnoses
were legitimate and establish clearer standards for the classification of
mental illness. A group of researchers at Washington University in St.
Louis, whom some called the "neo-Kraepelinians," published a manifesto
describing psychiatry as a science that should study discrete mental
illnesses uncovered through research utilizing statistical methodologies.46
In 1972, these researchers published what came to be known as the
Feighner criteria, which outlined specific diagnostic criteria for fourteen
psychiatric illnesses.47 The criteria were well-liked by the leader of the
APA task force for the DSM-III, Robert Spitzer, who I argue was attracted
to the criteria for reasons that were arguably political as much as
intellectual.4 8 Spitzer, having been intimately involved in the APA's
45. Id. at 728-729.
46. Hannah S. Decker, How Kraepelinian was Kraepelin? How Kraepelinin are the neo-Kraepelinians?
From Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III, 18 HIST. PSYCHIATRY 337, 345-348 (2007).
47. See generally Kenneth S. Kendler, Rodrigo A. Munoz, & George E. Murphy, The Development of the
Feighner Criteria: A Historical Perspective, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY (2010).
48. Id. at 138-139, 141. Kendler et al. describe how Robert Spitzer made six visits to meet with the
researchers at Wash U. who developed the Feighner criteria and that he learned lessons that then "deeply"
shaped his efforts with the DSM-III such as the need to operationalize criteria through using a checklist-
based set of symptoms to diagnose patients and the need to base the inclusion of diagnoses within the
manual on evidence in addition to "clinical wisdom." The same authors quote Spitzer, who argues that if
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negotiations with gay rights activists in the 1970s who wanted
"homosexuality" removed from the DSM, recognized the social
importance of diagnostic criteria that were more closely allied with
scientific backing.49 The search for rigorously defined, symptom-based
criteria took on an added political and social urgency as the scientists
sought to defend the conceptual and theoretical grounding of the DSM's
diagnostic criteria against accusations that diagnoses were merely arbitrary
condemnations of socially deviant behavior or vague categories whose
treatments insurers were required to partially cover with minimal
justification."o
The finished form of the DSM-III no longer described diagnoses as
reactions to intra-psychic disturbances but instead included detailed
outlines of the necessary features of an illness, the associated/frequent
features, and data on the age of onset, course, impairment, and
predisposing factors." Though the manual was aimed at use by clinicians,
biomedical investigators who were interested in categories amenable to
empirical research were the ones in charge of the manual's revision.5 2
Belying this focus, many changes to the manual facilitated empirical
research in addition to clinical practice. As Theodore Millon, one of the
DSM-III task force members describes "The schema . . . establishes a
coherent framework within which the data of future studies can be
systematically introduced."" The DSM-III seemed to successfully
accomplish this aim of creating standardized diagnoses for systematic
investigations into mental illness: as one commentator has noted, "both
referees and journal editors expected manuscripts submitted to scholarly
journals to be written in its [the DSM's] language," and a proliferation of
the, Feighner criteria had never emerged, the "DSM-III... would likely have looked quite different."
49. See Ronald Bayer, Politics, Science, and the Problem of Psychiatric Nomenclature: A Case Study of
the American Psychiatric Association Referendum on Homosexuality, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES:
CASE STUDIES IN THE RESOLUTION AND CLOSURE OF DISPUTES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 381, 387-
391 (Arthur L. Caplan ed., 1987). Homosexuality was removed during themseventh printing of the DSM-II
in July 1974 after a vote by the trustees of the American Psychiatric Association in December of 1973.
50. For an example from that time period of the critique of DSM diagnoses as condemnations of socially
deviant behavior, see, e.g. SZAZ, supra note 35. For a discussion of insurance companies' worries that the
treatments corresponding with DSM diagnoses had minimal evidence of efficacy, see Mayes and Horwitz,
supra note 10, at 253-254.
51. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: THIRD EDITION (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n eds., Am. Psychiatric Publ'g 1980). For a discussion
of the major features of the shift, see Gerald L. Klerman, The Advantages of the DSM-III, 14 AM J.
PSYCHIATRY 539, 540-541 (1984) (describing how some of the advantages of the DSM-III over previous
manuals are the fact that it contains "operational criteria" describing the observable symptoms of a disorder
rather than its presumed etiology and the fact that the psychiatric nomenclature would now be determined
by "the state of evidence rather than the assertions of competing ideological camps).
52. Millon, supra note 2, at 812.
53. Millon, supra note 2, at 808.
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journal articles citing DSM terminology bears witness to this
standardization.54
As Figures 1 and 2-a comparison of the DSM II criteria for anxiety
neurosis and the DSM-III generalized anxiety disorder-illustrate, the
DSM-III incorporated specific rules for the diagnosis of each disorder.
These rules, called "operational criteria," helped standardize research
across different sites and settings." They specified what features could and
could not be associated with a given disorder, and what minimal criteria-
age, a set number of symptoms-must be met in diagnosis.56 The purpose
of these major changes illustrates the way that reputational and economic
concerns influenced the manual. As Millon, the task force member, writes:
"uniform DSM-III criteria should help stem the tide of insubstantial,
unreliable, or at best minimally generalizable data that has come to
characterize publications in the field."" Though these clearer and more
precise criteria were presumably of aid to clinicians in diagnosis, Millon
emphasizes the way in which the manual's added clarity and coherency
will help generate "verifiable empirical knowledge" that the field sorely
needs."
54. Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 10, at 264.
55. Millon, supra note 2, at 808 (describing how operational criteria, by specifying criteria through which a
person could be included in or excluded from a diagnosis, would help different researchers include more
homogeneous patient populations in their studies by all applying the same rules to the diagnosis of the
patients).
56. Id. at 808.
57. Millon, supra note 2, at 808.
58. Id. at 808.
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Figure 1. DSM-II Anxiety Neurosis
300 Neuroses
Anxiety is the chief characteristic of the neuroses. It may be felt and
expressed directly, or it may be controlled unconsciously and auto-
matically by conversion, displacement and various other psychological
mechanisms. Generally, these mechanisms produce symptoms experi-
enced as subjective distress from which the patient desires relief.
The neuroses, as contrasted to the psychoses, manifest neither gross
distortion or misinterpretation of external reality, nor gross personality
disorganization. A possible exception to this is hysterical neurosis,
which some believe may occasionally be accompanied by hallucinations
and other symptoms encountered in psychoses.
Traditionally, neurotic patients, however severely handicapped by their
symptoms, are not classified as psychotic because they are aware that
their mental functioning is disturbed.
300.0 Anxiety neurosis
This neurosis is characterized by anxious over-concern extending to
panic and frequently associated with somatic symptoms. Unlike
Phobic neurosis (q.v.), anxiety may occur under any circumstances
and is not restricted to specific situations or objects. This disorder
must be distinguished from normal apprehension or fear, which occurs
in realistically dangerous situations.
Figure 2. DSM-II1 Generalized Anxiety Disorder
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Notably, the manual also claimed to be "atheoretical"-it sought to
describe symptom-based disorders without positing an underlying
theoretical construct for why these disorders may emerge or what
contributed to causing these psychiatric disturbances.5 ' The rationale
behind not incorporated supposed causes of mental illness was that not
enough was known about these causes to hypothesize about them in the
manual.60 Yet psychoanalysts questioned the manual's declared
agnosticism toward competing theoretical orientations. These psychiatrists
pointed to the exclusion of "neuroses" and other psychodynamic terms as a
"wholesale expurgation of psychodynamics from the psychiatric
knowledge base." 6 1
Rebutting these critiques, the psychiatrists in charge of the final
manual argued that the protests against the changes did not represent
legitimate differences in scientific opinion about the nature of mental
illness but instead, viewed the psychoanalysts' (failed) protests as
ideologically motivated and as an attack on "courageous" and non-
ideological science.62 Millon laments, "The furor and threats that ensued
deserve public censure for they were not mere idle posturings. A review of
the agonizing events that followed will be instructive in that they
illuminate the awesome power of unremitting 'political' pressure designed
to thwart a courageous and 'scientific' effort to undo questionable tenets
and conceptual presumptions that are unsupportable."" The DSM-III
framers, despite the many social pressures and intellectual contingencies
that had shaped the manual's development, framed the text as a victory of
"science over ideology." 64
59. Ronald Bayer & Robert L. Spitzer, Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III: A History of the
Controversy, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187, 187-9 (1985).
60. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: THIRD
EDITION: 7 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n eds., Am. Psychiatric Publ'g 1980) (describing how the DSM-III took
the approach of being "atheoretical" about the etiology of a disorder, except for the disorders for which the
cause was well-established). For a critique of the manual's claim to an "atheoretical" approach published
six years after the manual's publication, see David Faust & Richard A. Miner, The Empiricist in His New
Clothes: DSM-III in Perspective 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 962, 963 (1986) (arguing that features of the
DSM-III such as specifying a disorder's necessary age of onset make some assumptions about the types of
factors that can cause the disorder-for example, autism's necessary early onset compared -to
schizophrenia's later onset implies the two disorders likely have different causes).
61. Wilson, supra note 19, at 407.
62. Millon, supra note 2, at 807 (describing how critiques of the DSM-III were designed to thwart a
"courageous" effort to create diagnostic categories that were empirically supported).
63. Id. at 807.




D. DSM-III-R (1987), DSM-IV (1994), DSM-IV-TR (2000) and
the ICD
The DSM-III represented a paradigm shift in the field of psychiatry:
the eclipse of psychodynamic theory by a biomedical model that remained
agnostic on the underlying forces behind or etiology of psychiatric
disorders. The manuals and their revisions thereafter have done little to
tangibly alter the new paradigm. Yet the presence of "impure" influences
remains. In this section, I discuss the presence of these impure influences
during each of the manual's subsequent revisions. I then discuss four
broad themes that cut across these changes to the manual-(l) the text's
transformation into a widely-used psychiatric "bible," (2) the rise of
managed care and other cost-containment measures, (3) skepticism about
the categories' usefulness raised by neuroscience and genetics research,
and (4) the rise of disease-specific advocacy groups that attempt to exert
influence on the manual. Each force illustrates the way in which a diverse
array of stakeholders-research psychologists, the insurance industry,
clinical practitioners, patient and family advocates-often experience
tension between the divergent ways in which the manual can be used.
1. DSM-III-R through DSM-IV-TR
The DSM-III-R, published in 1987, contained far less dramatic
changes than the monumental shift that occurred from the DSM-II to the
DSM-III. Some new disorders were proposed-body dysmorphic
disorder, trichotillomania (compulsive hair pulling), and others-and the
revisers made various changes to the manual's wording, names for
disorders, and criteria sets.
Did newly emergent evidence in the field of psychiatry drive these
changes or did other drivers and forces play the predominant role? One
commentator, ruling out the idea that the changes were prompted by new
and compelling evidence for disorders, argues that the timeline for the
manual's updates undermines the idea that the changes were prompted by
empirically supported scientific concerns. 66 The DSM-III was published in
1980. The process of revising the manual began three years later in 1983-
too short a time, the commentator argues, for scientists to conduct and
replicate empirical studies that would support changes to the manual's
categories." Indeed, as the introduction to the DSM-III-R admits, "data
65. See Joseph M. Rey, DSM-III-R: Too Much too Soon? 22 AuSTL. & N.Z. J. Psychiatry 173, 174 (1988)
(Table I gives examples of new disorders).
66. Id. at 180.
67. Id at 180.
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from empirical studies were lacking" at the time of revision, and primary
importance was therefore given to "some other consideration. "68 One
consideration was clinician dissatisfaction with ambiguity in the manual;
another consideration was the fact that the APA was invited to contribute
to the upcoming 10th edition of the World Health Organization's
("WHO") International Classification of Diseases edition and needed to
begin scrutinizing the DSM-III for updates to make contributions to the
international manual. 69 The need for American psychiatry to present a
unified and credible face to the WHO was one "impure" concern
influencing the DSM-III-R.
Despite the modesty of the DSM-III-R's proposed changes, certain
categories provoked feminist outcry. Critics objected to three disorders
proposed for the DSM-III-R that appeared in its first draft in 1985: self-
defeating personality disorder, paraphilic coercive disorder, and pre-
menstrual dysphoric disorder.o
The criteria for self-defeating personality disorder-individuals who
make no demands on others, are self-sacrificing, and often neglect their
own goals and pleasures for those of others-"smacked of traditional
female role socialization" for feminists, who worried that the disorder
would be used to "blame" female victims of abuse or domestic oppression
by labeling those victims with a psychiatric disorder." Feminists critiqued
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (later renamed late luteal phase dysphoric
disorder) on similar grounds.72 By definition, it only applied to one gender
and its inclusion could lead to the stigmatization of "normal women.""
These two critiques highlight the manual's influence on popular notions of
mental illness and the fear accompanying that influence. The DSM and
psychiatric diagnoses were no longer esoteric constructs, marginalized
even by psychiatrists within clinical practice. The DSM had achieved a
degree of prominence such that commentators critiqued its constructs from
the lens of how those constructs would interact with societal gender roles
68. Id. at 180.
69. Robert L. Spitzer & Janet B.W. Williams, Introduction to AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xvii, xxi (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n eds., Am. Psychiatric
Publ'g 1987).
70. See Constance Holden, Proposed new Psychiatric Diagnoses Raise Charges of Gender Bias, 231 Scl.
327, 327-8 (1986) (describing the three disorders criticized by feminist groups).
71. See Herb Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, The Defeat of Masochistic Personality Disorder, MAKING US
CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 126, 133 (1997).
72. See Jeanne Maracek & Rachel T. Hare-Mustin, A Short History of the Future: Feminism and Clinical
Psychology, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN QUART. 521, 525-526 (1991)(describing how feminists challenged
dysphoric disorder for its "discriminatory impact" in only labeling women and worried that the inclusion of
the disorder corresponded to pharmaceutical marketing interests rather than genuine female needs).
73. Holden, supra note 70, at 327.
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and the stigmatization of "normal" female behavior. While earlier critics
such as Foucault and Szasz had spoken in broad swaths about the
pathologization of human deviance, critics of the DSM-III and DSM-III-R
homed in on the ramifications that specific diagnoses, their names, and
their criteria could have for certain sub-groups within American society.
Changes in the media coverage of mental illness also reflect a new
cultural preoccupation with specific DSM diagnoses. As one empirical
study of articles published in Time, Newsweek, and other periodicals
confirms, articles focused on specific disorders rather than mental illness
in general began to occupy a larger proportion of total articles on mental
illness.74 The proportion of disorder-specific articles grew from 36% of the
sample in 1965 to 54% of the sample in 1988." These empirical findings
highlight that the DSM had become a very "public" document, with critics
increasingly focused on specific mental illnesses rather than the nature of
mental illness in general.
Paraphilic coercive disorder, which described persons who took
delight in the coercive aspects of rape or sexual molestation, was critiqued
not for the stigma it could introduce but the exoneration it could grant,
with feminists voicing concern that the psychiatric label would help acquit
rapists and molesters." Again commentators adopted a different lens to
view the constructs than the clinical and research focused lens adopted by
the manual's revisers. The legal import of a category, and an exemption
from legal responsibility that a category might grant, stood at the root of
the objection to paraphilic coercive disorder. As a commentator surveying
the controversy noted, "critics seem to be operating from a somewhat
different conceptual basis from the psychiatrists, one which. . .overtly
acknowledges the political role of psychiatry."" The DSM stood at the
nexus of various political concerns-feminists' focus on female equality;
worries that judges and jurors viewed mental disorders as proverbial "get
out of jail free" cards-and as the manual became more prominent across
a diverse array of contexts-legal, insurance, cultural parlance-criticism
of the manual along these diverse lines became more pointed.
Ultimately, the APA Work Group compromised with critics of the
three additional categories, moving premenstrual disorder and self-
defeating personality disorder to an appendix of the manual reserved for
74. Otto F. Wahl & Arthur L. Kaye, Mental Illness Topics in Popular Periodicals, 28 CMTY. MENTAL
HEALTH J. 21, 24 (1992).
75. Id at 24.
76. Holden, supra note 70, at 327.
77. Id. at 328.
2013] 169
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 15.2:147
conditions "requiring further study" and excluding paraphilic coercive
disorder entirely.
The DSM-IV and the DSM-IV-R made similarly modest changes.
Yet while critics indicted the third edition of the manual for the dramatic
revisions it had made to psychiatric diagnosis-removing references to
"neurosis"; defining disorders by observable symptoms rather than
underlying psychic conflicts-many critics of the new editions had the
opposite complaint: if the APA was only going to make modest and minor
changes to the manual, what was the point of publishing revised
manuals?79  Critics began to accuse the APA of using the DSM as a
substantial revenue stream and of failing to clearly articulate the reasons
for a given revision.so
2. Four Themes across the Recent Editions of the DSM
Cutting across the DSM's revisions from the 1980s to the current
decade are four broad forces that have shaped the manual and its
categories, each of which highlights the way that diverse stakeholders with
diverse and sometimes divergent interests have influenced the DSM over
the years.
Success and standardization
The first force has been the unprecedented success of the DSM-III as
compared to previous manuals. As discussed, clinicians at the time of the
first two manuals viewed diagnoses as an ancillary aspect of clinical
treatment, preferring a focus on a patient's subjective life history and
pattern of "inner turmoil."" The DSM-III, which was influenced by
researchers who prioritized a symptom-based diagnostic model, then
cemented symptom-based diagnoses within clinical practice. The DSM
lost its status as a handbook that was largely irrelevant to practitioners and
became a "bible" in the United States that provided a common language
78. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Appendix A: Proposed Diagnostic Categories Needing Further Study, in
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: 367, 367-374 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n
eds., 1987). This diversionary tactic-sidelining an ethically contentious disorder to the manual's
appendix-was used again for controversial disorders proposed for the DSM-5, with proposed disorders for
Internet addiction and "risk" for psychosis moving to the manual's appendix after public critique. See John
M. Gryhol, Final DSM 5 Approved by American Psychiatric Association, PSYCH CENT. (2012), at
http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2012/12/02/final-dsm-5-approved-by-american-psychiatric-
association/.
79. See generally Mark Zimmerman, Is the DSM-IV needed at all? 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 974,
975 (1990).
80. Id. at 975.
81. See Sabshin, supra note 64, at 1270-1271 (describing the 1960s climate of little interest in empirically
based psychiatric classification, which was viewed as "esoteric").
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for not only researchers and practitioners, but also insurance companies for
reimbursement, pharmaceutical companies in research, federal grant-
making bodies such as the NIMH, the FDA for drug approval processes,
school districts for special education benefits, courts in determinations of
insanity and civil commitment, and patient activist groups that form
around a shared diagnosis. The manual exerted an influence not only
across diverse settings but also across diverse localities. As one
commentator summarizes,
European pharmaceutical companies that hoped to enter the
American market knew that DSM-III criteria must be used for
patients in clinical trials if those trials were to be accepted by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Moreover, clinical
researchers in Europe understood correctly that publication in
American journals would require, at a minimum, a DSM-III
characterization of their patient sample. Pressures such as these
... have little to do with the validity of the nomenclature. 82
The manual's influence was self-reinforcing. The wide adoption
researchers led to ubiquitous use in FDA approval and journal article
review processes, which in turn led to wider adoption by researchers and
drug companies adhering to the implicit or explicit "rules" and guidelines
of those review processes. 83
As Robert Spitzer argues, the DSM-III's success across these diverse
settings and localities was largely unprecedented: sales of the DSM-I and
DSM-II generated only "modest revenue," while sales of the DSM-III
"primarily to non-psychiatrists" were, according to Spitzer, "enormous."84
The DSM-III sold 600,000 copies worldwide in its seven years of
publication," a figure pointed to as evidence of its widespread appeal-
82. Jack D. Maser, Charles Kaelber, & Richard E. Weise, International Use and Attitudes TowardDSM-III
and DSM-III-R: Growing Consensus in Psychiatric Classification, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 271, 272
(1991).
83. For a discussion of the FDA's mandate to pharmaceutical companies to "target psychoactive drugs to
biomedical conditions," see DAVID HEALY, THE ANTIDEPRESSANT ERA 100, 257 (1997) (discussing how
the FDA began to try to modernize its regulatory process by encouraging the pharmaceutical industry to
develop compounds that corresponded to a specific disease indication, and highlighting how drug studies
worldwide have adopted the DSM criteria to meet this FDA requirement). For a discussion of how the
DSM-III helped standardize research between different investigators, see ANDREW LAKOFF,
PHARMACEUTICAL REASON: KNOWLEDGE AND VALUE IN GLOBAL PSYCHIATRY 12-13, 35 (2005) (arguing
that the DSM-III led to a "diagnostic infrastructure" that helped specific mental illness serve as transferable
entities across different countries and different types of research).
84. Robert L. Spitzer, DSM-III and the Politics-Science Dichotomy Syndrome, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 522,
523 (1985).
85. Lucille P. McCarthy, A Psychiatrist using DSM-III: The Influence of a Charter Document in
Psychiatry, in TEXTUAL DYNAMICS OF THE PROFESSIONS: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES OF
WRITING IN PROFESSIONAL COMMUNITIES 358, 358 (Charles Bazermon & James Paradis eds.,1991).
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"that the DSM-III has been responded to well is evident. . .in the rather
startling number of copies that have been sold to date, a figure that is best
grasped by the fact that more orders were received in the first six months
following its publication than in both previous DSM editions combined,
including 30-plus re-printings."86 The DSM-IV sold 961,324 copies; by
comparison, there were only 42,000 psychiatrists and around 300,000
mental health professionals in the United States at that time." The
dominance of the DSM across this heterogeneous array of settings has
made many potential stakeholder conflicts more visible, conflicts I will
discuss in the next section of this paper.
Uptake by Third-Party Payers for Reimbursement and Cost Control
The second force cutting across the DSM-III to DSM-IV-TR revision
process is utilization of the manual to determine the financing of mental
illness treatment and to control the cost of this treatment. This has led to
two developments: first, a divergence between the specialized practitioners
who revise the manual and the generalist practitioners who use it and
second, the labeling of patients with diagnoses that lead to more generous
reimbursement regardless of their veracity in describing the patient's
symptoms.
Examining the first development, the rise of managed care and an
emphasis on less expensive and more efficient psychiatric interventions
has affected the practice of both psychiatry and clinical psychology. Cost-
conscious health care favors brief interventions conducted by less
expensive practitioners-for example, master's degree social workers,
B.A. level addiction counselors, or primary care physicians-rather than
expensive psychiatrists and clinical psychologists." The DSM, constructed
by clinician-researchers who often specialize in a given disorder or even
subtype of a disorder, may appear too burdensome and complex for non-
specialist practitioners delivering an increasing amount of clinical care in a
cost-conscious environment.
The second development occurs even among specialist practitioners
who focus on a subset of diagnoses. Evidence shows that these
practitioners often explicitly use the DSM more to facilitate
reimbursement than to guide the treatment that it is provided. Sociologist
Owen Whooley documents the "psychiatric workarounds" of the DSM that
86. See Millon, supra note 2 at 807-8.
87. See Michael B. First, The DSM Series and Experience with DSM-IV, 35 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 67, 68-69
(2002).
88. See generally TIMOTHY J. TRULL, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 70 (7th ed. 2005).
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some psychiatrists take-a psychiatrist may give a patient a disease code
that distorts the patient's problems to help that patient obtain insurance
reimbursement for treatment." Or as one interviewee in Whooley's sample
describes, "I purposely put down a more intense diagnosis, not ever to lie,
but to sort of. If they might be dysthymic but there's a possibility that they
might have depression, I put down depression, so that they can get
reimbursed."o Another psychiatrist discusses the ethical tension between
serving the patient's interest in reimbursement and deceiving insurance
companies." Insurance companies' perceptions of which diagnoses
warrant generous coverage and which diagnoses do not have shaped
clinical practice to adhere to reimbursement-granting DSM codes.
Divergence Between Clinical Utility and Research Utility
Ever since the DSM-III's shift away from the blurry continua of
psychodynamic theory, some have argued that the DSM's categorical
approach-either you have the disorder or you do not-is an inaccurate
codification of the dimensional facets of mental illness. The dissatisfaction
stems from both clinical and research observations. First, clinicians often
have to rely on "not otherwise specified" ("NOS") diagnoses-"catch-all"
categories within broader diagnoses-for patients who do not meet the
criteria for a specific diagnosis, which may illustrate that highly-specific
criteria that aid in inter-rater reliability fail to capture the "true
heterogeneity of clinical populations."92 Second, the significant rate of co-
morbidity among DSM diagnoses raises questions about whether the same
pathology has been falsely divided into discrete diagnostic silos.93 These
two problems may inevitably accompany any system of psychiatric
classification, and the categories may be worthwhile even despite these
drawbacks. Yet the problem of NOS diagnoses and significant co-
morbidities sheds light into clinical difficulties with the manual's discrete
categories.
89. See generally Owen Whooley, Diagnostic Ambivalence: Psychiatric Workarounds and the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 SoC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 452, 452-469 (2010).
90. Id at 461.
91. Id. at 461, 462.
92. Steven E. Hyman, Diagnosis of Mental Disorders in Light of Modern Genetics, in THE CONCEPTUAL
EVOLUTION OF THE DSM-5, 7 (Darrel A. Regier, et al. eds., 2011). For example, one epidemiological study
of a community sample labeled at high risk for depression gave 52% of the sample diagnoses of depressive
disorder not otherwise specified (NOS). A national sample of persons with personality disorder found that
22.3% were best described as having personality disorder NOS. See Lee A. Clark et al., Diagnosis and
Classification of Psychopathology: Challenges to the Current System and Future Directions, 46 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 121, 136 (1995).
93. Hyman, supra note 92, at 7.
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From the perspective of research, some argue that the DSM's
diagnostic silos impede fruitful research into the "molecular corollaries" of
"higher order clinical phenomena."9 4 Many of these concerns are raised by
researchers interested in the genetic and neural mechanisms behind
different forms of psychopathology, researchers who argue that a system
of discrete categorizations based on a patient's clinical presentation
impedes research into "causal networks that include cognition, emotion,
hormones, neural circuits, and their molecular pathways and structures.""
In response to these concerns, the Diagnostic Spectra Study Group for the
DSM-5 was charged with proposing cross cutting dimensional assessments
that transcend specific symptom-based diagnoses.96 Although the group
initially planned to create domains for symptoms that occur in many
diagnoses (e.g. anxiety, sleeping issues) that could then be correlated with
genetic variants or neurobiological processes, the final manual appears to
have abandoned in this attempt." Instead, and as I discuss in greater detail
later, the National Institute of Mental Health ("NIMH") has taken up the
mantle of creating cross-cutting dimensions for mental disorders through
its Research Domain Criteria ("RDoC"), which aim to move psychiatric
diagnosis away from symptom-based diagnoses to classification based on
symptoms shared by many disorders such as "anhedonia or emotional
appraisal bias or psychomotor retardation."9 8 In turn, the NIMH hopes to
link these cross-cutting assessments to shared neural substrates, shared
biomarkers, shared genetic risk factors, or shared treatment response."
This intellectual shift to a system of disease classification more amenable
to basic psychopathology research highlights that the DSM faces difficulty
proving useful to both clinicians and biomedical researchers.
Patient Advocacy and the "Democratization" of the DSM
The last societal force that has affected DSM development is the
explosion of disease-specific advocacy groups over the past three decades.
Daniel Carpenter hastracked the formation of over 3,100 disease-specific
94. Charles Sanislow et al., Developing Constructs for Psychopathology Research: Research Domain
Criteria, 119 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 631, 632 (2010) (arguing that molecular corollaries have failed to
map on one-to-one with DSM disorders and that "the same [biological] mechanisms can be implicated in
'different' disorders, whereas multiple mechanisms can be implicated in 'one' disorder.").
95. Id. at 632.
96. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic Spectra Study Group, Meet Us: Diagnostic Spectra, at
http://www.dsm5.org/MeetUs/Pages/DiagnosticSpectra.aspx.
97. American Psychiatric Association, Highlights of Changes from DSM-IV-TR to DSM-5, at
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-tr/ 20to%20dsm-5.pdf
98. Thomas Insel, Tranforming Diagnosis (Apr. 29, 2013) at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/index.shtml.
99. See generally Insel, supra note 98.
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advocacy groups with at least some connection to political issues, and
based on a review of founding dates, argues that there was a dramatic
increase in "high-specificity health groups in the 1970s and especially the
1980s.""o As I will discuss in greater detail in the next section and in the
case study of autism, patient lobbies coalesce around a DSM diagnosis and
can exert significant influence on the regulatory and legislative process,
whether arguing for expedited FDA approval of a pharmacological therapy
targeting a specific diagnosis or for state-mandated insurance coverage of
expensive treatments for a diagnosis.
One of the largest mental illness advocacy organizations, the National
Alliance on Mental Illness ("NAMI"), has brought together grassroots
advocates from different states since its founding in 1979."' The name of
the group, highlighting mental illness and its mission statement, drawing
analogies between mental illnesses and diseases such as diabetes and heart
disease, coincided with the biomedical research into mental illness sparked
by the DSM-III. The organization has recognized the DSM as an important
tool in advocacy, and when the task force behind the DSM-5 opened a
public comment period, NAMI issued a press release encouraging
"individual and families to familiarize themselves with the draft of the new
DSM."l02 NAMI explained that, "the DSM historically has had a very
significant impact on the treatment of mental illnesses and on the payment
of mental health treatment and related services."'o
As I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, the APA task
force's confinement of "patient benefit" to the accuracy and reliability of a
diagnosis in a clinical setting can clash with a broader conception of
"patient benefit" espoused by some advocacy groups. A large degree of
advocacy work is focused on economic issues such as insurance
reimbursement for treatment, social issues such as the stigmatization of the
mentally ill, or support of legislation linking a diagnosis with social
service guarantees. Groups may be interested in DSM diagnoses for the
way they advance or impede patient's well-being in these settings rather
than in clinical treatment alone. Despite these potential clashes, the APA
has at least ostensibly welcomed the influence of these groups, publicizing
the manual's revisions through three public commenting periods in which
100. Daniel Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, and Lessons for
Policy, 23 HEALTH AFF. 52, 57 (2004).
101. Agnes B. Hatfield, The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill: A Decade Later, 27 CMTY. MENTAL
HEALTH J. 95, 98 (1991).
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over 12,000 comments have been submitted, stating "patients can and
should play a more active role in the formation of diagnostic criteria for
mental illness."l0 4 David Kupfer, the chair of the DSM-5 Task Force, noted
that it was the first time in the manual's history that revisions to
psychiatric categories would be integrated with patient and family input."o
The "democratization" of input into the DSM categories-from a one-
year, closed-door process led by a small subset of prominent researchers to
a multi-year, highly public process where patients and advocates voice
their opinion-is a development that clearly shows that stakeholders bring
interests to the DSM revision process that are worth elucidating.
3. A Brief Note: the DSM and the ICD
While my focus in this paper is on the DSM, the manual is closely
related to the International Classification of Diseases ("ICD"), which is
also presently undergoing a revision process."o' The ICD is under the
authorization of the World Health Organization ("WHO"), and had little in
common with the DSM until the DSM's 1980 revision.o The international
success of the DSM-III led to public pledges to make the two manuals
align more closely, and in 1982, the ICD decided to adopt the DSM's
"operational approach" to symptom-based diagnoses.os The two are
revised on roughly the same schedule, and have converged in recent years
in establishing very similar diagnostic categories.
However, important differences remain. Some argue that these
differences are desirable because they stem from different aims of two
classification schemes.' 9 They point to the ICD's aim of creating a
104. DARREL A. REGIER et al., Patient Involvement in the Development of DSM-V 73 PSYCHIATRY:
INTERPERSONAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 308, 308 (2010). See also Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, DSM-5
Draft Criteria Draws Nearly 2,300 Responses (2012), at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/12-
30%2OFinal%20DSM%20Public%20Comment.pdf. (describing the more than 12,000 comments submitted
since 2010 over the three open commenting periods).
105. Emily A. Kuhl, David J. Kupfer & Darrel A. Regier, Patient-centered Revisions to the DSM-5, 13
JAMA ETHICS 873, 878 (2011).
106. The ICD has a later "due date" of 2015. See Norman Sartorius, Revision of the Classification of
Mental Disorders in the ICD-11 and DSM-V: Work in Progress, 16 ADVANCES IN PSYCHIATRIC
TREATMENT 2, 2 (2010).
107. See Robert E. Kendell, The Relationship between DSM-IVand ICD-10, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
297, 299 (1991) (arguing that as a result of the dramatic revision of the DSM in the form of 1980's DSM-
III, the intemational community began to recognize the "benefits" of the DSM's innovations and
incorporate these innovations into the ICD to make the systems of classification more similar).
108. See Mario Maj, Psychiatric Diagnosis: Pros and Cons of Prototypes vs. Operational Criteria, 10
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 81, 81 (2011).
109. Kendell, supra note 107, at 299-300 (arguing that possible benefits of differences between the two
manuals is that researchers will have a genuine choice between two very different diagnostic systems, the
fact that many different countries with different resources, culture, and zie use the ICD codes while the
DSM is ostensibly geared towards the United States, and the fact that mental illness such as sexual
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comprehensive classification of diseases diagnosed, by a range of health
care professionals in countries with a wide range of health care resources
versus the DSM's intended use for "one, or perhaps two, professions-
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists""1 0 in the United States. In this
view, the DSM should be more detailed and complex, for it is geared
toward highly-trained researchers and medical practitioners in a high-
income nation. This explicit audience stands in contrast to the ICD's broad
focus on public health professionals in countries that sit on a wide
spectrum of economic development. Meanwhile, others argue that the
differences between DSM and ICD criteria are undesirable because they
undermine international research collaboration and because the U.S.
requires under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) that ICD codes are used on all billing transactions."'
II. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE DSM DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS
The previous section illustrated that the DSM has never been a
project that exists solely within a scientific community of psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists. Instead, the manual and its revisions are scrutinized
and influenced by a diverse array of societal stakeholders with interests in
how psychiatric disturbance is defined and categorized. The manual went
from an oft-ignored and marginalized document even for those within the
profession during its first two editions (the DSM-I and II) to a document
that attracted scrutiny from cultural critics, third-party payers, those
worried about its influence on legal exoneration, patient advocates, and
others. Whether it is insurance companies underscoring the importance of
clear categories and cost-efficient treatment, feminists protesting the
psychiatric labeling of oppressive gender roles, or disease advocacy
groups lobbying for greater funding for their specific condition, the DSM
"bible" has become the common language of mental illness in the United
States. In this section, I will discuss seven groups of stakeholders, each
problems and eating disorders are likely over-emphasized in the U.S. relative to their importance in other
countries).
110. Id at 299.
111. See generally Michael B. First, Harmonisation of ICD-11 and DSM-V: Opportunities and
Challenges, 195 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 382, 382-90 (2009) (for example, the research agenda for the
DSM-5 explicitly notes that "trivial differences in criteria wording, threshold number of symptoms, or
exclusion criteria" between the ICD and DSM can substantially affect diagnostic concordance). In terms of
the need for ICD codes on billing transactions, psychiatrists with the ICD code, and not realize that they
just gave an ICD diagnosis; or they may record their clinical encounters in DSM terminology before
converting to ICD. See Geoffrey Reed, Toward ICD-11: Improving the Clinical Utility of WHO's
International Classification ofMental Disorders, 41 PROF'L PSYCHOLOGY 457, 458 (2010).
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with significant interest in the construction of DSM diagnoses: clinicians,
researchers, patients and their families, legal professionals, school
districts, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance providers. In the next
section, I will illustrate my discussion of how different stakeholders have
different interests in the manual's uses through a case study of autism,
where the interests of these stakeholders have sharply collided." 2
A. Clinicians
The DSM is first and foremost designed to aid clinicians in the
process of the diagnosis and treatment of patients with mental illness."'
We can separate clinical practice into two sets of interests: the Hippocratic
and the administrative.
I argue that clinicians have so-called Hippocratic interests to relieve
the patient suffering that brings him to the clinician in the first place. The
classification of psychiatric disorders as clusters of signs and symptoms
(the current model) or as biomarker-associated pathologies (what may
become more common in the future) is only valuable to clinicians if these
classifications can aid in treatment.1"' While a researcher may also be
interested in classifications that correspond with appropriate treatments in
order to work backwards from an effective treatment to an understanding
of the underlying basis for the disorder, one should not gloss over the ways
in which the clinician and researcher's interests may diverge. A clinician is
only interested in the etiology or cause of a condition to the extent that
knowledge of that etiology aids in treatment. Furthermore, the fact that
primary care physicians provide a non-negligible amount of mental health
service provision-one epidemiological survey found that 20% of patients
receiving treatment for mental illness receive that treatment from a general
medical physician-points to the fact that generalist clinicians ma'y require
a different level of detail and complexity than specialty psychiatry,
biology, and genetics researchers."' For these reasons, Michael First, a
112. As the battles between the Freudians and Kraepelinians illustrate, there is significant heterogeneity
within each category of stakeholder, and the abstract interests I present could not possibly encompass the
diverse array of interests present within each community.
113. For example, some argue that that the primary aim of the manual is to be a "helpful guide in clinical
practice," an aim that supersedes the manual's other interests in aiding research, improving information
surrounding disorders, and educating patients, litigators, legislators and others about psychopathology. See
Michael B. First, Clinical Utility. A Prerequisite for the Adoption of a Dimensional Approach in DSM, 114
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 560, 560-61 (2005). See also Roel Verheul, Clinical Utility of Dimensional
Models for Personality Pathology, 19 J. Personality Disorders 283, 286-95 (2005).
114. Robert Kendell & Assen Jablensky, Distinguishing Between Validity and Utility of Psychiatric
Diagnoses, 160 Am. J. Psychiatry 4, 9-10 (2003).
115. See Phillip S. Wang, Olga Demler, & Ronald C. Kessler, Adequacy of Treatment for Serious Mental
Illness in the United States, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 92, 94 (2002).
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psychiatrist who specializes in the study of psychiatric classification, argues that
user accessibility is one oft-neglected feature of the DSM, which involves
simplifying criteria sets to make the manual easier to use in clinical
practice to help patient suffering, even though a more complex criteria set
may provide more detailed information for researchers." 6 Researchers may
want categories with an increased number of subtypes that may correspond
with different etiological pathways, different genetic predispositions, and
other items of research interest, while clinicians may need to balance the
desire for nuance and complexity with the fact that added detail may
detract from rather than enhance that clinician's ability to help his or her
patients.
Though clinicians would likely enjoy living in an ideal world where
the Hippocratic oath and patient care were their sole clinical concerns, in
reality, clinicians have extensive administrative and other responsibilities
that create a second set of interests in diagnostic categories. These include
medical record keeping, filing for insurance reimbursement, clinical
education, communication with other clinicians for the referral of patients,
and cost pressures that may reduce their time with patients.
Significant changes to a new DSM may dampen its widespread usage
if the changes impose significant administrative burdens or have other
disruptive effects on clinical practice. For example, First has urged
caution on transforming the DSM into a dimensional system that may
"complicate medical records and the collection of vital statistics by
creating a sharp disparity between diagnoses of mental disorders and
diagnoses of general medical conditions.""' In addition, First argues that
the, "the extraordinary complexity of the current diagnostic system, with
each revision including more categories, more subtypes, and more
specifiers focused on increasingly fine distinctions,""' may also impede
diagnosis, especially if clinicians experience time pressure when making
contact with patients.
Addressing the concern of practical categories accessible to
generalists or time-constrained specialists, one commentator retorts: "to
116. It is worth noting that some forms of increased complexity in diagnostic descriptions can benefit even
generalist clinicians. For example, the DSM-IV's addition of an "atypical features" specifier to various
mood disorders helped clinicians recognize that patients in that subtype may respond poorly to tricyclic
antidepressants. See Michael First & Drew Westen, Classification for Clinical Practice: How to Make the
ICD and DSMBetter Able to Serve Clinicians, 19 Int'l Rev. Psychiatry 473, 474 (2007).
117. See Michael B. First, Clinical Utility: A Prerequisite for the Adoption of a Dimensional Approach in
DSM, 114 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 560, 561-64 (2005). See also Roel Verheul, Clinical Utility of
Dimensional Models for Personality Pathology, 19 J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS 283, 283-302 (2005).
118. Geoffrey Reed, Toward ICD-11: Improving the Clinical Utility of WHO's International Classification
of Mental Disorders, 41 PROF'L PSYCHOL. 457, 459 (2010).
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those who argue that the DSM . . . ultimately must yield to important
practical considerations, I respond with James Clerk Maxwell's famous
dictum: 'There is nothing more practical than a good theory."'" Maxwell
is correct in one sense: good theory can aid in research that ultimately
improves treatment in the long run. Yet the precision and complexity that
may aid in the formation of good theory, and that may be useful to
specialized practitioners worked in research settings, may be simply too
impractical for the primary care clinicians with limited time and limited
psychiatry-specific training who treat many persons with mental illness.
The precise mechanism behind neurotransmitter reuptake matters little to
clinicians working in day-to-day practice. Instead, a clinician's good
theory may be theory that aids in his patient's recovery and the
administrative tasks that support effective treatment.
B. Researchers
Many patients may receive a diagnosis and care from a primary care
physician rather than more expensive specialists, such as psychiatrists or
clinical psychologists, a descriptive reality that points toward diagnostic
categories that avoid burdensome complexity. In contrast, researchers are
almost always specialists. Though it is impossible to provide an exhaustive
account of how different researchers may view diagnoses, I will focus on
the interests of three types of investigators: biomedical researchers
studying genetic or neural biomarkers associated with psychiatric
disturbance, epidemiologists investigating the prevalence and social
distribution of mental illness, and researchers investigating the
comparative effectiveness of different treatments for the same condition.
1. Biomedical Researchers
The interests of biomedical researchers arguably diverge most
sharply from the interests of clinicians, for the specific etiology of a
disorder matters less to a clinician than how to improve the patient's well-
being. As discussed, one notable development spanning across recent
revisions of the DSM has been the manual's failure to accurately reflect
the state of neuroscientific and genetic research into mental illness. Studies
aimed at finding neural and genetic biomarkers that correspond to DSM
diagnostic categories have shown that biomarkers or shared family history
often fail to correspond to a shared DSM diagnosis.120 A single family may
119. Lee A. Clark, Temperament as a Unifying Basis for Personality and Psychopathology, 114 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 505, 516 (2005).
120. Hyman, supra note 92, at 8. Hyman, a member of the DSM-5 task force and neuroscience researcher,
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contain patients with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other diverse
conditions and shared genetic variants may contribute to a person's risk for
many different disorders.12 ' Other studies find that biomarkers correspond
to a multiplicity of disorders. 2 2 For example, research into the interaction
between a boy's MAOA allele and physical abuse has shown that certain
polymorphisms may moderate the effect of environmental stressors.123
However, the MAOA polymorphism predicts vulnerability to a range of
different disorders: attention deficit disorder, antisocial personality
disorder, and general emotional problems.124 Biomarker-based risk factors,
therefore, have rarely mapped on to single DSM disorders, instead
showing vulnerability to multiple DSM diagnoses.
For many researchers investigating the underlying basis of
psychiatric disturbance, a different approach seems more promising-
disaggregating the DSM's symptom-based discrete categories into
dimensions in psychosis, mood disturbance, emotion regulation issues that
transcend "well-bounded categories."' Antisocial personality disorder
may need to be disaggregated into aggression, aggression may require
disaggregation into impulsivity, and each of these phenomena may extend
across a broad range of disorders. Researchers have asserted that while
DSM diagnostic categories may be well suited for clinical settings, studies
into the neural and genetic bases of affective states or groups of behaviors
look more promising than studies that neatly map onto to the DSM's
highly specific and discrete symptom-based system. 2 1
contends that genetics and neuroscience studies have posed distinct challenges to the DSM classification
scheme. Hyman states that ". . . far from providing the predicted validation of schizophrenia (or other
disorders) as discrete categories . . . findings of family and genetic studies have posed serious problems for
a system that builds highly specified categories from phenomenological building blocks."
121. Id. at 8. See also Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, Identi/ication of
Risk Loci with Shared Effects on Five Major Psychiatric Disorders: A Genome-Wide Analysis, 381 THE
LANCET 1371, 1371-79, 1-9 (2013), available at http://press.thelancet.com/psychiatricdisorders.pdf
(discussing overlap in genetic risk factors for five DSM disorders: major depressive disorder, bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder).
122. See generally Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, Identification of Risk
Loci with Shared Effects on Five Major Psychiatric Disorders: A Genome-Wide Analysis, 381 LANCET
1371-1379 (2013) (describing how specific genetic variants are associated with three different adult-onset
psychiatric disorders-schizophrenia, major depression, and bipolar disorder-and that these genetic risk
factors thus have a broader phenotypic effect than mapping on to one specific psychiatric diagnosis).
123. See Julia Kim-Cohen et al., Maltreatment, and Gene-Environment Interaction Predicting Children's
Mental Health: New Evidence and Meta-analysis, 11 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903, 903-13 (2006).
124. Id at 907-8.
125. Hyman, supra note 92, at 9.
126. For example, a group of researchers assert that "[d]ependence on conventional nosologies leaves the
enterprise of understanding mechanisms of psychopathology in the awkward position of assuming the
validity of single disorders and organizing research accordingly. This approach implicitly assumes that a
given disorder maps onto mechanisms amenable to discovery via suitable investigations. However, it is not
clear that conventional diagnoses can fulfill this role, and it may be important for researchers to develop
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2. Epidemiologists
For epidemiological researchers less interested in the underlying
etiology of a specific behavior or affective state and more interested in
tracking the incidence and prevalence rates of mental illness over time and
across different communities, consistency across manuals is important for
longitudinal research. Thus, while researchers may want to jettison the
current system of discrete DSM classifications and move to a model
focused more upon cross-disorder dimensions, the manual since the DSM-
III has only made small, conservative changes, in part to maintain
continuity in large-scale clinical trials or longitudinal epidemiological
research.' 27 in contrast to other researchers, epidemiologists are less
interested in aggression levels over time or the number of patients with a
specific neurotransmitter dysfunction. As a result, the discrete disease
categories of the DSM may be more amenable to epidemiological research
than to basic research into psychopathology, though vague diagnostic
criteria that reduce inter-rater reliability can complicate the
epidemiological picture.12
3. Comparative Effectiveness Researchers
The last category of investigators, those studying the comparative
effectiveness of different therapeutic interventions, will receive more
power and funding as the U.S. attempts to contain its health care costs.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 has allocated over
$1 billion for comparative effectiveness research that investigates the
benefits and harms of different interventions in 'real-world settings."l29
constructs and theories that are not tightly bound to extant diagnostic conventions. Specifically, it may be
necessary to deconstruct currently defined higher order clusters of complex behaviors (or subsets of these
clusters) into intermediate functions that are not themselves clinical symptoms in order to understand the
relationship of higher order "criterion" symptoms to lower order causal networks that include cognition,
emotion, hormones, neural circuits, and their molecular pathways and structures." See Sanislow, supra note
94, at 632.
127. Hyman, supra note 92, at 10-1. As Hyman notes, . even small changes in wording could produce
significant disruptions to epidemiology ... such disruptions would militate against tinkering without very
strong justification."
128. However, some psychiatric epidemiologists have recently questioned whether the manual pays
enough attention to their research needs. These epidemiologists have asserted that revisions of the manual
need to more closely monitor differences in diagnostic prevalence by sex, ethnicity, income or geographic
region. This response by epidemiologists, however, reiterates my argument about the fundamental
usefulness of existing DSM diagnoses to epidemiologists. The epidemiologists do not want to radically
revise psychiatry's system of classification; instead, they want the existing system of classification (the
DSM) to pay closer attention to variation in the prevalence rates of mental illness across communities to aid
research into potential sources of this variation. See Helena B. Hansen, et al. Independent Review Of Social
And Population Variation In Mental Health Could Improve Diagnosis In DSM Revisions, 32 HEALTH AFF.
1, 1-10 (2013).
129. See Jeffrey S. McCombs et al., Applying Comparative Effectiveness Research Methods in Bipolar
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") enacted in 2010
established the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute ("PCORI"),
which will allocate $600 million per year to comparative effectiveness
research and spreading its findings when fully funded.'30 Comparative
effectiveness research for psychiatric disorders has focused on different
pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions.' 3 ' How do
comparative effectiveness researchers conceive of DSM categories and
which changes to the DSM are desired or unwelcome? Do comparative
effectiveness researchers have more in common with basic science
researchers, epidemiologists, or practicing clinicians?
Comparative effectiveness researchers' interest in DSM categories
depends on various features of the methodology that they may employ. I
will focus on two aspects: first, whether the study is conducted
retrospectively or prospectively and second, the desired "pragmatism" of
the study methodology.
In terms of retrospective versus prospective research, researchers
relying on retrospective observational research that uses insurance claims
data, electronic medical records, or other sources of health data across time
may have an interest in minimal changes to categories across editions.132
Frequent changes interfere with the interpretation of data sets that may
transcend multiple DSM editions. These retrospective researchers are
bound by what is noted in the insurance claim or electronic health
records-information likely limited to a diagnostic code-so continuity
between manual editions is important for these researchers in the same
way that it is important for many epidemiologists tracking diseases across
time/locality. In contrast, comparative effectiveness researchers launching
prospective studies that follow patients forward over time and that do not
rely on data from insurance claims or electronic health records have more
flexibility with regards to the DSM diagnoses. For example, the
Biomarkers for Rapid Identification of Treatment Effectiveness in Major
Depression ("BRITE-MD") comparative effectiveness study finds that a
biomarker-prefrontal brain activity as measured by
electroencephalography-can predict response and recovery rates to
antidepressants with up to 74% accuracy, and, after a week of treatment,
Disorders, 130 J. Affective Disorders 145, 145-6 (2011).
130. See Michael Lauer and Francis Collins, Using Science to Improve the Nation's Health System, 303
JAMA 2182, 2182 (2010).
131. See generally Phillip S. Wang, Christine M. Ulbricht, & Michael Schoenbaum, Improving Mental
Health Treatments Through Comparative Effectiveness Research, 28 HEALTH AFF. 783, 783-91 (2009).
132. For a description of retrospective analyses using electronic health records, see Walter F. Stewart et al.,
Bridging the Inferential Gap: The Electronic Health Records and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF.
w181, w184 (2007).
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help predict whether a patient will respond better to an SSRI or non-
tricyclic antidepressant.'33 This type of comparative effectiveness research,
which can look at biomarkers and subtypes in addition to discrete
diagnoses, has more in common with the needs of basic science
researchers than with the needs of epidemiologists.
The second methodological feature of CER that will dictate the
usefulness of DSM categories is the desired "pragmatism" of the
experimental design.'34 CER that is more pragmatic tries to mimic the
"real-world" conditions in which most treatment takes place: it features
non-specialized practitioners rather than specialized researchers and
includes heterogeneous patient populations, such as patients with multiple
co-morbidities, rather than a homogeneous patient population only
suffering from one condition.' The more pragmatic a CER design is, the
more it may be bound to the DSM and its diagnoses because these
diagnoses are widely used by non-specialized practitioners seeing patients
with a complex mix of conditions. Comparative effectiveness research that
features specialized practitioners in academic settings treating patients
with only one, rather than multiple disorders, in contrast, may be able to
use more specialized diagnostic tools than the DSM categories, such as
biomarker-based stratification of patients with a given disorder into
different subgroups.
Despite these documented divergences between basic science
researchers, epidemiologists, and comparative effectiveness researchers,
all are currently bound by the ubiquity of DSM diagnoses among grant
making institutions and journal review boards. As a result, researchers,
regardless of the methodology they use, often find themselves framing
their research with reference to the DSM, regardless of the manual's
warnings that it is not, "designed or intended to further basic science."
C. Patients and their Families
The main interest of patients and their families aligns with the
clinician's Hippocratic interest in helping the patient improve and
133. Andrew F. Leuchter et al., Comparative Effectiveness of Biomarkers and Clinical Indicators for
Predicting Outcomes of SSRI Treatment in Major Depressive Disorder: Results of the BRITE-MD Study,
169 PSYCHIATRY RES. 124, 124-31 (2009).
134. For an overview of making research more "pragmatic," see generally Kalipso Chalkidou et al., The
Role for Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trials (pRCTs) in Comparative Effectiveness Research, 9 CUN.
TRiALS 436,436-446 (2012).
135. Id. at 439.
136. Helena C. Kraemer, DSM Categories and Dimensions in Clinical and Research Contexts, 16 INT'L J.
METHODS PSYCHIATRIC RES. S8, S9 (2007).
184
THE DSMATA CROSSROADS
recover.' As a result, I will not repeat myself in reiterating the way in
which a physician's Hippocratic interest aligns with DSM categories; like
physicians, patients are interested in DSM diagnoses insofar as those
categories aid in treatment and improvement. In this section, I will
highlight two especially strong concerns that are unique to patients:
interest in minimizing out-of-pocket treatment expenses and interest in or
rejection of a disease community. Furthermore, I will note where a
patient's interests may diverge from the interests of his or her family.
One pronounced interest of patients is in insurance reimbursement. A
patient who allocates a certain amount of his income to insurance
premiums will presumably want that paid-for plan to cover as much of
their treatment as possible, with affordable co-payments or co-insurance
and minimal out-of-pocket expenses for therapy or medication.' As a
result, a patient may have a clear financial interest in having DSM
diagnoses that are as broad as possible. While clinicians may be interested
in diagnoses that are highly predictive of patient response to treatment, and
researchers may be interested in diagnostic categories that aid in
biomedical, epidemiological, or comparative effectiveness investigation,
patients' financial interest in diagnoses may be more basic. If a patient is
distressed and believes that an intervention-therapy, pharmacological, or
other-will help alleviate that distress, the patient has an interest in
minimizing the amount they must pay for the distress-alleviating
intervention.
The utility of DSM diagnoses in reducing a patient's personal
financial responsibility for treatment is strengthened by laws such as
1996's Mental Health Parity Act ("MHPA") and 2008's Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act ("MHPAEA"), which require that
insurance companies ensure that financial requirements such as co-pays,
deductibles, and treatment limitations are no more restrictive for mental
illnesses than for physical illnesses.139 As of 2010, the DSM was cited over
320 times in state-level legislation clarifying these requirements.140 The
137. This statement is complicated by the fact that Axis II personality disorders are sometimes labeled
"ego-syntonic;" they can be a welcome part of an agent's stable self-identity and the agent may have no
interest in recovery. However, since many DSM diagnoses contain an explicit mention that the patient must
experience distress or impairment in functioning from his or her symptoms, this section will operate off the
assumption that most patients and their families want to improve and "recover" to a higher level of
functioning.
138. However, it's worth noting that more generous employer-based insurance coverage may result in
lower wages for a given patient, complicating the extent to which more generous mental health coverage
may ultimately benefit a patient financially.
139. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) (2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsmhpaea.html.
140. Ralph Slovenko, DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 6, 6 (2011).
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successful passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA") in 2010 further promotes these parity requirements by setting
forth Essential Health Benefits ("EHBs") that must be offered by each
insurance plan offered in individual and small group markets.141 One of the
ten categories of EHBs is "mental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment,"1 42 and nothing in the
legislation or its implementation likely requires such coverage for persons
who lack an explicit DSM diagnosis but believe they would benefit from
mental health services anyways. As a result, patients have a strong
financial interest in their distress having an accompanying DSM diagnosis,
because private or public payers often require this diagnosis.
The other way in which broadly defined categories may promote a
patient's interests is by lending support for public awareness, attention,
and resource allocation to a given DSM diagnosis. Several disease specific
advocacy organizations have argued that the prevalence of the disease for
which they are lobbying has increased to the level of epidemic.143 To the
extent that this public attention and resource allocation translates into
improved health outcomes and service eligibility for a patient with a
specific diagnosis, broad disease categories promote a patient's interests
through contributing to a perception of a disorder's high prevalence.
While financial and resource allocation interests may increase a
patient's interest in broad DSM diagnoses, there are several other non-
financial interests that impact a person's interest in receiving a psychiatric
diagnosis, including the stigmatization of mental illness and membership
in a disease community. Stigma complicates the homo economicus portrait
of mentally ill patients as utility-maximizing health care consumers. In the
U.S., two-thirds of people who meet the DSM-criteria for a clinical
disorder receive no treatment, and researchers point to stigma and
discrimination as significant barriers that perpetuate this treatment gap. 44
141. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, (PL 111-148, March 23, 2010). United
States Statutes at Large, 119 (2010) pp. 163-166. See generally Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief
Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFF. 1, 1-4 (2012).
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 141, at 124.
143. See e.g. Mark Roithmayr, 1 in 88: We Need a Strategy (Mar. 19, 2012) at
http://www.autismspeaks.org/blog/2012/03/29/
1-88-we-need-strategy (where the Director of the Autism Speaks advocacy organization argues that autism
"can officially be declared an epidemic" and that this epidemic status warrants a national strategy aimed at
increasing research funding for the disease). See also Alzheimer's Assoc., Alzheimer's Association
Applauds Obama Administration For Dedication Of New Resources To Alzheimer's Epidemic, at
http://www.alz.org/news-andevents-alz-association_applauds-obama_
administration.asp?WT.mcid=enews2013 04_10 (where the Alzheimer's Association thanks the Obama
administration for allocating earmarking $100 million of the FY2014 budget to fund research and caregiver
support efforts).
144. See generally Kathleen M. Michels et al., Stigma and Global Health: Looking Forward, 367 LANCET
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A patient may eagerly seek to avoid receiving a DSM diagnosis, especially
one such as schizophrenia or antisocial personality disorder that laypeople
associate with violence or destructive behavior; he or she may have an
interest in highly-specific symptom-based categories that do not reflect his
or her specific form of distress. In turn, a patient's desire to avoid a
diagnosis may diverge from his family's interest in getting him appropriate
treatment for his disturbance.
Disease communities have complicated the phenomenon of stigma,
providing spaces for sufferers of stigmatized conditions to coalesce around
a shared DSM diagnosis and turn what some perceive as a disability into a
source of identity-based pride.'45 Though a detailed sociology of which
DSM diagnoses have flourishing disease communities is outside the scope
of this paper, Asperger's disorder is one prominent example. Asperger's,
or "Aspie," pride groups have proliferated, with one website extolling
Asperger's as a cultural identity rather than a medical condition.146 These
pride groups have an ambivalent relationship with DSM diagnoses. They
are somewhat dependent upon these diagnoses to recognize each other as
fellow group members yet many reject attempts to describe their condition
as a "medical disease" that needs curing, instead emphasizing the need for
social support services.'4 7 Further complicating the picture, and revealing
that "pride" groups may be in a minority, there are many disease
communities, such as NAMI, that actively support the definition of mental
illness as a disease entity in need of treatment and thus have a more
explicit interest in DSM diagnosis-based insurance reimbursement.'48
538, 538-39 (2006); See also Gerald T. Keusch, Joan Wilentz, & Arthur Kleinman, Stigma and Global
Health: Developing a Research Agenda, 367 LANCET 525, 525-27 (2006).
145. See generally Renee R. Anspach, From stigma to identity politics: Political activism among the
physically disabled and former mental patients, 13 SOc. SC. MED 765, 767-769 (arguing that identity-
based social movements reject the societal conception of a given disorder as stigmatizing and instead
demonstrate through activism their pride in the condition).
146. ASPERGIAN PRIDE, at http://www.aspergianpride.com/about/.
147. For example, transgender activists have an ambivalent relationship to the DSM category of "gender
identity disorder." While some activists initially sought to have the diagnoses removed from the manual
entirely, arguing that the diagnosis seemed to imply that having a transgender identity is pathology,
activists wanted to keep some reference to the disorder in the new DSM-5 to assist in reimbursement for
hormone therapy and other treatments. The compromise was a new disorder called "gender dysphoria." See
Moni Basu, Transgender No Longer a Mental 'Disorder,' CNN BLOG (Dec. 27, 2012), at
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/27/being-transgender-no-longer-a-mental-disorder-in-diagnostic-
manual/.
148. The concept of disease-pride communities has provoked much controversy that I do not have room in
this section to address. For example, eating disorder researchers almost always condemn pro-anorexia
("pro-ana") disease communities, which offer tips on starvation-techniques and photographs of fashion
models as "thinspiration," citing the harm these communities may cause to the patient in enabling her to
resist recovery. See generally Mark Norris et al., Ana and the Internet: A Review ofPro-Anorexia Websites,
39 INT'L J.EATING DISORDERS 443. 443-7 (2006).
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D. Legal Professionals
The preface to the DSM-IV-TR explicitly warns against the use of
the manual for forensic purposes, arguing that its use in legal contexts
poses significant risks that the information will be misused or
misunderstood. The APA argues that this misuse/misunderstanding will
occur because of the "imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the . information contained in a clinical
diagnosis."' 4 9 Despite this official caveat, one researcher describes how the
manual has been cited in over 5,500 court opinions.' Furthermore, the
DSM itself notes that:
When the presence of a mental disorder is the predicate for a
subsequent legal determination (e.g. involuntary civil
commitment), the use of an established system of diagnosis
enhances the value and reliability of the determination . . .
DSM-IV may facilitate the legal decision makers' understanding
of the relevant characteristics of mental disorders . . . Finally,
diagnostic information regarding longitudinal course may
improve decision making when the legal issue concerns an
individual's mental functioning at a past or future point in
time. '
While clinicians should be interested in diagnostic categories that aid
in the design of treatment options, legal professionals should be seeking a
related but distinct set of information. For example, the DSM diagnostic
category of schizophrenia may be useful for practicing clinicians, since the
signs associated with the category of schizophrenia are helpful for
treatment, but the category itself should not be used as a heuristic for
judges and others in the legal systems. In the U.S., an insanity defense
requires that a defendant lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality/wrongfulness of his conduct, a determination that DSM
categories in and of themselves (should) provide little insight in making.152
149. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: FOURTH EDITION - TEXT REVISION xxxiii (2000).
150. Slovenko, supra note 140, at 6.
151. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 138, at xxxiii.
152. Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 114, at 10. Unfortunately, an expanding body of evidence shows that
DSM categories do substantially affect legal procedures such as sentencing. For example, a recent study
presented 181 state trial judges with a hypothetical vignette containing "expert testimony" on a case of
aggravated battery describing the perpetrator as a "diagnosed psychopath." Vignettes that contained this
diagnosis plus "testimony" from a neurobiologist testifying about the biological mechanism behind the
disorder, gave significantly shorter sentences than judges reading the diagnosis alone. See Lisa G.
Aspinwall, Teneille R. Brown, & James Tabery, The Double Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase
or Decrease Judges' Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 SCI. 846, 846-9 (2012). Thus, as DSM diagnoses
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Since the relationship of the DSM to the law has received extensive
treatment elsewhere, 15 3 1 will focus on one topic out of the many that lie at
the boundaries of law and the DSM: the way in which small changes in
DSM wording can have outsize legal ramifications.
One example of a small change with large ramifications involves
sexually violent predator ("SVP") involuntary commitment statutes, which
are based upon two criteria in most states: the offender must have been
convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and must suffer
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."' 54 It is important to
note that, at least on a federal level, the definition for "mental
abnormality" is deliberately de-coupled from the DSM. In Kansas v.
Hendricks, the Supreme Court stated that, "The term mental illness is
devoid of any talismanic significance . . . We have traditionally left to
legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal
significance . . . Often, those definitions do not fit precisely with the
definitions employed by the medical community."' 5 Yet the de-coupling is
not so clear-cut in other Supreme Court statements. In 2002, the court in
Kansas v. Crane, specifically argues that the "presence of what the
'psychiatric profession itself classified . . . as a serious mental disorder"'
helped the Hendricks court decide whether the offender's uncontrollable
dangerousness merited civil commitment.156  Furthermore, some
commentators have argued that despite these judicial reiterations that
"mental abnormality" should not be conflated with a DSM diagnosis, in
practice, diagnoses of paraphilia are a significant contributor to civil
commitment decisions.' For example, one analysis of 450 incarcerated
sex offenders under consideration for civil commitment found that
paraphilia not otherwise specified ("NOS") demonstrated a strong and
significant association with recommendation for commitment, with
variables such as an offender's statement of intent to commit a new sex
spur research into the genetic and neural mechanisms behind disorders, judges may view this evidence,
rightly or wrongly, as a mitigating factor in sentencing.
153. See generally Ralph Slovenko, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY (2nd ed. 2009).
154. Michael B. First & Robert Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually Violent Predator
Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIC L. 443, 443 (2008).
155. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997). For a discussion, see generally, Douglas Tucker &
Samuel Brakel, DSM-5 Paraphilic Diagnoses and SVP Law, 41 ARCH. SEX. BEHAV. 533, 533 (2012).
156. Kansas v. Crane_534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). See generally First & Halon, supra note 154, at 444.
Furthermore, looking at 2010's U.S. v. Carta, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated that an
assessment of mental abnormality does not need a corresponding DSM diagnosis to be valid for SVP civil
commitment purposes, a DSM diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified (hebephilia) could indeed
qualify an offender for civil commitment. See U.S. v. Carta 592 F.3d 34(2010).
157. First & Halon, supra note 154, at 444.
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crime or a prior probation failure playing a lesser role than a DSM
diagnosis.'
The heavy reliance on DSM diagnoses in legal contexts raises the
question: to what extent should the diagnosis' wording be aimed at
warding off conflated uses of the diagnosis in SVP commitment cases?
For example, some have argued that a slight change in wording between
the DSM-III-R and the DSM-IV in one criterion for sexual disorders was
gravely misinterpreted and misapplied in the legal context.' The changes
in criterion A between the two editions were as follows:
DSM-III-R: "recurrent sexual urges and fantasies . . . over a
period of six months."6 o
DSM-IV: "recurrent, intense, sexually arousing fantasies,
sexual urges or behaviors . .. over a period of six months."' 6 '
As a result of this slight change in wording, an offender's sexually
violent behavior by itself could be construed as evidence pointing toward a
"mental abnormality" used to justify civil commitment. In other words, the
act of rape alone could justify a diagnosis of a mental disorder, regardless
of whether that rape was motivated by abnormal and uncontrollable sexual
urges. In the APA's defense, Allen Frances, the head of the DSM-IV task
force and an outspoken critic of many of the current manual's proposed
changes, contends that the task force did not predict the legal
reverberations of this slight change in wording:
Work group members do not understand that the DSM is read
very differently by lawyers and by psychiatrists and other
mental health practitioners. Even when the DSM criteria sets
and text are written with a consistency that is sufficient for
clinical, research, and educational purposes, the wording does
not always stand up well to the technical rigor of precise legal
dissection. By training and inclination, lawyers parse every
158. Jill S. Levenson & John W. Morin, Factors Predicting Selection of Sexually Violent Predators for
Civil Commitment, 50 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 609, 618 (2006).
159. See Allen Frances, The Forensic Risks ofDSM V and How to Avoid Them, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 11, 11 (2010).
160. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 161
(Am. Psychiatric Ass'n eds., 3rd ed. 1987).
161. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 524, 524-
5 (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n eds., 4th ed. 1994).
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phrase for meanings never foreseen by those writing primarily
for a psychiatric audience. 16 2
Though Frances' defense of the persons revising the DSM perhaps
exaggerates the "technical rigor of precise legal dissection" to exempt the
drafters for responsibility for the ramifications of the wording change, the
work groups are composed of psychiatrists and researchers rather than
legal professionals with knowledge of how various diagnoses may be used
or abused in courts. All of the members of the DSM-5 Sexual and Gender
Identity Disorders work group either have PhDs in clinical psychology or
medical degrees."' None have an explicit educational background in
law.'64 In the conclusion of this paper, I argue that the APA task force,
despite its liability-averting preface, must retain sensitivity to the use of
the DSM in legal and other contexts. One small step to cultivating this
sensitivity is to include lawyers who are trained in parsing "every phrase"
for its legal implications on the Work Groups for disorders that are
frequently cited in court cases and legislation.
E. School Districts
Just as the DSM's usage extends beyond the clinical context and into
legal proceedings, the manual is also used by school districts in the
determination of special education benefits. The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, passed in 1975, gives an evaluation committee
that includes the child's parents, teachers, and qualified professionals the
power to determine what educational services are provided to the child
under the requirement that every child has the right to a "free and
appropriate public education" ("FAPE").'65 In addition, the committee is
required to use the diagnostic criteria outlined in the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR"), rather than the DSM.166
States are given the power to determine their own specific special
education disability criteria, as long as the categories are more generous
than the federal guidelines.1"7 As discussed more fully in the next section,
162. Frances, supra note 159, at 11.




165. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
166. Jaclyn MacFarlane & Tomoe Kanaya, What Does it Mean to be Autistic? Inter-State Variation in
Special Education Criteria for Autism Services, 18 J. CHILD. & FAM. STUDIES 662, 662 (2009).
167. See Craig J. Newschaffer, Matthew D. Falb, & James G. Gurney, National Autism Prevalence Trends
from United States Special Education Data, 115 PEDIATRICS e277, e280 (2005) (discussing how although
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many states' CFR criteria for autism, for example, are identical to the
DSM diagnostic guidelines, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD") often falls under the "other health impaired" category, and the
CFR definition of "emotional disturbance" has been discussed with
reference to the DSM's Major Depressive Disorder, Antisocial Personality
Disorder, and Conduct Disorder."' The close interplay between
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") regulations and
DSM diagnoses raises the question: what are school districts seeking in
DSM diagnoses? I will look at two sets of interests: Deweyan and
financial.
The Deweyan interests, loosely named after the educational
philosopher, are similar to the clinician's Hippocratic interests. School
districts should want the children in that district to succeed, and to the
extent that individualized education plans ("IEP") mandated by the IDEA
allow that child to flourish, school districts have an interest in DSM
diagnoses that help accurately pinpoint children who may suffer from
psychiatric issues that require special educational attention. Even if a DSM
diagnosis is perhaps too broad and "falsely" diagnoses people whose
disturbance lies below the threshold of a DSM disorder, it is difficult to see
how an IEP will harm a student, except for issues with social exclusion or
stigmatization that may stem from observable educational
accommodations. If I have some of the symptoms for ADHD, for example,
but not enough to meet the DSM's diagnostic threshold, it is possible that
an IEP that involves extra time on tests, homework accommodations, and
assignments tailored to my preferred learning style will lead to better
educational outcomes than a non-tailored plan. As a result, a school's set
of Deweyan interests may favor broad diagnostic criteria that err on the
side of inclusivity.
Often competing with the Deweyan interest in educational flourishing
is a school district's interest in containing educational expenditures to a
reasonable level, though it remains ambiguous whether broad or narrow
diagnostic categories aid in this cost containment. Special education
spending has grown faster than regular education spending since the
1980s, and now represents a large share of district budgets.16 9 Though a
the IDEA provides a standard definition for each disability category, individual states develop their own
eligibility criteria).
168. See Carl B. Gacano & Tammy L. Hughes, Diferentiating Emotional Disturbance from Social
Maladjustment: Assessing Psychopathy in Aggressive Youth, 41 PSYCHOL. SCH. 849, 849-50 (2004).
169. See generally Hamilton Lankford & James Wyckoff, Where Has the Money Gone? An Analysis of
School District Spending in New York, 17 ED. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 195, 195-218 (1995). See




detailed analysis of the reasons for this increase is beyond the scope of this
paper, one group of researchers describes how states' policies of
reimbursing a large portion (usually 30-50%) of a school district's special
education costs can create a financial incentive for schools to label
children "disabled" if they are on the borderline between the two
classifications. This occurs because "services delivered to students with a
'disability' label are likely to be either partly or fully reimbursed by the
state, whereas the same services given to students without a recognized
disability are not."'70 As a result, school districts may face competing
financial interests with regard to broad or narrow DSM criteria. Broad
criteria may help schools label a child "disabled" and thus receive some
state support for specialized education services, yet narrow criteria may
help schools avert these expensive services in the first place if parents are
unable to obtain a diagnosis that proves that their child requires special
accommodations. As the case study of autism in the next section illustrates
more concretely, parents have often filed litigation against school districts
that refuse to pay for expensive behavioral treatments in the context of
special education, showing that financial pressures do play a role in
shaping schools' interest in DSM diagnostic criteria.
F. Pharmaceutical Companies
From a purely economic standpoint, pharmaceutical companies have
a stake in high prevalence rates for a given disorder. As marketplace
agents, they hope to have a large population of potential consumers to
whom a given medication can be marketed, and hope that these consumers
will require a given medication for a long length of time. Psychotropic
drugs represent a sizable source of profit for pharmaceutical companies;
antidepressants, for example, are the most commonly prescribed class of
drugs and have annual sales exceeding $9 billion."' Though sinister
critiques of the role of pharmaceutical companies in supporting broad and
vague DSM diagnostic criteria abound,'72 pharmaceutical companies also
170. Donna L. Terman, Mary B. Lamer, Carol S. Stevenson, & Richard E. Behrman, Special Education for
Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, 6 FUTURE CHILD. 4, 6 (1996).
171. See Mark Olfson & Steven C. Marcus, National Patterns in Antidepressant Medication Treatment, 66
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 848, 848 (2009) (stating that in 2005, anti-depressants became the most
commonly prescribed class of medications in office-based and outpatient-based medical practice,
surpassing anti-hypertensives); See also IMS HEALTH, Top Therapeutic Classes by U.S. Sales, available at
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/
StaticFile/TopLine Data/Top%20Therapy%20Classes%20by%20U.S.Sales.pdf (for a description of the
amount of U.S. sells of antidepressants).
172. For example, see critiques that the pharmaceutical industry profitably capitalized on broadened
criteria for illnesses such as social anxiety disorder; See generally Michelle Cottle, Selling Shyness, NEW
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have an interest in restricting diagnostic categories to only include those
with a pathology that is responsive to pharmacological intervention. With
FDA approval contingent upon demonstrated effectiveness data from
clinical trials, pharmaceutical companies have an interest in diagnostic
categories that appropriately screen out patients who will not exhibit
improvement during the clinical trial. For example, as one group of
researchers note, citing six separate studies, "the response to
antidepressant therapy is greater for patients that are severely depressed at
baseline measurement as compared to patients with less severe
depression.",7 1 To the extent that overly broad diagnostic criteria dilute a
treatment's demonstrated efficacy in a clinical trial patient population,
pharmaceutical companies have an interest in more stringent or more
accurate diagnostic criteria, an interest that competes with their financial
interest in high disease prevalence rates.
The pharmaceutical industry's interest in stringent criteria for the
sake of approval, however, may be weakened by two developments in
pharmaceutical prescribing and marketing. First, health services research
shows that many patients who lack a DSM diagnosis for which
antidepressants are FDA-approved nevertheless receive prescriptions for
antidepressants, indicating that although pharmaceutical companies may
need persons with severe enough disorders to respond to treatment for the
purpose of clinical trials, a broad range of persons may take the drug post-
approval.'74 Therefore, pharmaceutical companies could perhaps construct
clinical trial inclusion criteria that both require participants to have a DSM
diagnosis and require them to exhibit a certain disease severity level; then,
post-approval, market the drug to everyone with the disorder regardless of
severity. Second, and bolstering the first development, are recent changes
to the regulation of pharmaceutical "off-label" marketing. In 2012, a U.S.
appeals court ruling stated that the government cannot prosecute
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives for speech
promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA approved drug.'7 ' This
ruling may further undermine a pharmaceutical company's interest in
accurate diagnostic criteria-as long as a drug works well enough to be
REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 1999) at 24-9.; See also HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 211-2.
173. Arif Khan, Amritha Bhat, James Faucett, Russell Kolts, & Walter A. Brown, Antidepressant-placebo
Diferences in 16 Clinical Trials over 10 Years at a Single Site: Role of Baseline Severity, 214
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 961, 962 (2011).
174. See generally Ramin Mojtabai & Mark Olfson, Proportion ofAntidepressants Prescribed without a
Psychiatric Diagnosis is Growing, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1434, 1436-8 (2011).
175. U.S. v. Caronia, No. 09-5006-cr (2nd Cir, Dec. 3, 2012). For a discussion of the ruling on off-label
marketing, see generally Marcia M. Boumil, Off-label Marketing and the First Amendment, 368 NEW ENG..
J. MED. 103, 103-5 (2013).
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approved for one psychiatric (or other) indication, it can be marketed for a
wide array of disorders.
G. Third-Party Payers
Third-party payers, by contrast, have a financial interest in a healthy
population pool that invests in generous health insurance but rarely utilizes
expensive medical services. While insurance companies maligned the
DSM in the 1960s and 1970s as a voracious consumer of insurance dollars,
mental health care is no longer an expensive and budget-draining medical
expenditure compared to other medical services and technologies. 176 As a
result, private insurers do not have a pressing financial interest in more
restrictive diagnostic categories, though, as discussed in the next section,
private insurers have been reluctant to cover extremely expensive
behavioral therapies for autism.
The private insurance data is perhaps skewed, however, by the large
number of mentally ill patients who are either uninsured or receive
healthcare through Medicaid. '7 This data suggests that state and federal
governments have a more pressing financial incentive to support more
narrow DSM diagnostic categories that exclude patients from
reimbursement, while private insurers face less financial pressure due to
their smaller proportion of mentally ill beneficiaries.
III. AUTISM CASE STUDY
In the previous section of this paper, I illustrated the heterogeneity of
stakeholder interests in DSM diagnostic categories. These heterogeneous
interests highlight the DSM's power across a broad array of domains. The
manual guides clinical care, impedes or facilitates biomedical investigation
into the etiology of psychiatric disturbance, determines patient's out-of-
pocket health care costs by aiding in insurance reimbursement, enables
176. One study of private insurers found that behavioral health expenditures, including expenditures for
psychiatric drugs, constituted only 5.2% of all health expenditures in the sample. Expenditures on
behavioral health contributed to only .3% of the growth in total health care spending. See generally Tami L.
Mark, Rita Vandivort-Warren, & Kay Miller, Mental Health Spending by Private Insurance: Implications
for the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, 63 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 313, 315-6 (2012).
177. See generally Rachel L. Garfield et al., The Impact of National Health Care Reform on Adults With
Severe Mental Disorders, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 486, 490 (2011). The study finds that, "because they are
more likely to meet the income eligibility criteria (because of low income) and categorical requirements for
coverage (because of mental health-related disability), nonelderly adults with mental disorders are over
three times more likely than those without to be covered by Medicaid." Therefore, it seems that Medicaid
has a higher proportion of persons with mental illness than private insurance for multiple reasons: mental
illness is associated with low income levels and mental illness can help a person qualify for disability
benefits that then make him or her Medicaid eligible.
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disease communities to coalesce around a shared diagnosis, is referenced
in thousands of court cases, affects special education criteria and
expenditures, and contributes to pharmaceutical profits. My aim in this
section is to bring into focus the sometimes dramatic clash of these
interests through a case study of the DSM-5's proposed changes to autism
spectrum disorder ("ASD"). In choosing autism as a case through which to
highlight the different interests that stakeholders bring to psychiatric
classification, I chose a case that acutely highlights the clashes between
different interests and for which the clashes have received large amounts
of public attention. It is important to note that my selection of the autism
case has two methodological limitations: first, autism is a DSM disorder
that has provoked significant public controversy, both regarding its
etiology (e.g. genetics, environmental exposures, vaccines) and its degree
of improvability; therefore, the stakeholder conflicts for autism are
perhaps more pronounced than for other disorders because of its contested
nature. Second, is the fact that as a developmental disorder, autism
implicates a unique constellation of stakeholder interests-parents, school
districts, insurers due to the expensive nature of behavioral treatment-
that are different than the unique constellation that another DSM disorder
may implicate.
With these methodological limitations noted, I believe the case study
has import for highlighting clashes of interests in diagnoses beyond
autism. I begin with an overview of the proposed changes and controversy
and then discuss the way in which the main stakeholders in the conflict-
clinicians and patients' families-invoke the notion of "patient benefit" to
justify opposing positions.
A. Evolution of DSM Autism Diagnosis and Proposed Changes
The measured prevalence of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has
increased dramatically in recent decades: a recent report by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that one in eighty-eight
children in the U.S. has been identified with autism spectrum disorder, a
23% increase since 2009 and 78% increase since 2007.17' Researchers have
178. Center for Disease Control & Prevention, Why Are Autism Spectrum Disorders Increasing, at
http://www.cdc.gov/Features/AutismPrevalence/. However, scholars debate about whether the increase in
measured prevalence reflects an increase in actual prevalence, pointing to the broadening of DSM criteria
for the disorder and the introduction of autism as a reporting category under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). See Morton A. Gemsbacher, Michelle Dawson, & H. Hill Goldsmith,
Three Reasons Not to Believe in an Autism Epidemic, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 55, 55-8
(2005).
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failed to find a specific cause that accounts for the dramatic increase."7 As
a result, the CDC is careful to note that although the reasons for the
increase in the identified prevalence of ASD are not completely
understood, "some of the increase is due to the way children are identified,
diagnosed, and served in their local communities, although exactly how
much is due to these factors is unknown. Also, it is likely that reported
increases are explained partly by greater awareness by doctors, teachers,
and parents."'
Other researchers have been less cautious than the CDC, asserting
that much rather than some of the increase in identified prevalence stems
from the broadening diagnostic criteria between editions of the DSM.'8 '
Before the DSM-III, autism was often grouped with other developmental
disorders labeled "childhood schizophrenia."l8 2 The DSM-III included
autism, but was focused on the most severely affected individuals, and was
"monothetic," requiring that each potential patient meet every diagnostic
requirement.' The DSM-III-R introduced a set of "polythetic" criteria,
where an individual must meet a certain number of criteria across different
diagnostic sub-categories, thereby increasing the inclusiveness of the
diagnosis.'84 This inclusiveness increased even further in the DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR, where the category of Asperger's disorder was added,
thereby including individuals without cognitive disability but with social
impairments.'" Autism is characterized by social delays, language delays,
and repetitive or obsessive behavior; Asperger's is distinguished by later
delays in communication and language usage, average or above average
intelligence, and obsessive behaviors; Pervasive Developmental Disorder-
Not Otherwise Specified ("PDD-NOS") refers to children who do not meet
the criteria for autism because of the late onset of their symptoms or other
factors.' 6 These categories often end up being associated with different
levels of functioning and severity, with autism as the lowest
179. Center for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 190.
180. Id.
181. Gernsbacher, supra note 178, at 55-6.
182. James C. McPartland, Brian Reichow, & Fred Volkmar, Sensitivity and Specificity of Proposed DSM-
5 Diagnostic Criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, 51 J.ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 368,
369 (2012).
183. Id. at 369.
184. Id. at 369.
185. Mark Bertin, Understanding the DSM-5 Autism Criteria," PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Jan. 30, 2012), at
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/child-development-central/212010/understanding-the-dsm-5-
autism-criteria.
186. Marja-Leena Mattila, Autism Spectrum Disorders According to DSM-IV-TR and Comparison with
DSM-5 Draft Criteria: An Epidemiological Study, 50 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
583. 583-4 (2011).
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functioning/most severe of the three and Asperger's and PDD-NOS as less
severe/higher-functioning.
The DSM-5 has proposed collapsing these three sub-categories into a
single autism spectrum disorder. A study examining over 900 participants
in a DSM-IV autism field trial, some of whom were diagnosed with either
autism, Asperger's, or PDD-NOS, found the new criteria to be more
restrictive. 1 7 Only 60% of the previously diagnosed participants met the
new diagnostic criteria for the collapsed autism spectrum disorder.'" The
subjects excluded under the new criteria had higher-cognitive functioning
and were more likely to previously have a diagnosis of Asperger's or
PDD-NOS.' 89 The authors argue that the large reduction in the number of
individuals who meet criteria for the disorder indicates that the new
diagnostic criteria reduces sensitivity-the criteria's ability to "pick up" on
everyone who has the disorder-while increasing specificity: the criteria's
ability to correctly exclude individuals from a diagnosis.190
In January of 2012, four months before the results were formally
published, one of the study's authors, Fred Volkmar, ignited controversy
after a preliminary presentation of the results at a meeting of the Icelandic
Medical Association.' 9 ' A New York Times article declaring that the
proposed DSM changes would make it more difficult for individuals to
receive a diagnosis was picked up by a variety of general interest news
media outlets, underscoring the DSM's transformation from a rarely-used
text at the periphery of the psychiatric community to a locus for public
discussion and debate about mental illness. 9 2  In turn, this discussion
revealed substantially different conceptions of how "patient benefit" ought
to be construed for persons with autism and Asperger's.
B. Objections to Changes and Three Clashes of Interests
Objections to the proposed changes stemmed from anxieties about
the impact the new criteria would have on access to services for patients
with autism. The introduction to McPartland and Volkmar's paper
explicitly emphasizes the "public health" ramification of the analysis,
187. McPartland, supra note 82 at 368-382.
188. Id. at 369.
189. Id. at 380.
190. Id. at 381.
191. Benedict Carey, New Definition ofAutism Will Exclude Many, Study Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/health/research/new-autism-definition-would-
exclude-many-study-suggests.html?_r-1.
192. Media covering the proposed changes ranged from The Huffington Post to Biomed Middle East, with
a "Google News" search turning up over 600 articles on the topic.
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arguing that "reducing the number of individuals in the general population
who meet criteria for ASD could result in lost eligibility for service for
individuals who stand to benefit."l 93 In interviews with the media,
Volkmar presented the reduced eligibility for services as the study's
alarming and important conclusion, arguing that, "given the potential
implications of these findings for service eligibility, our [McPartland,
Reichow, and Volkmar] findings offer important information for
consideration by the task force finalizing DSM-5 diagnostic criteria."' 94
Interestingly, only one of the three authors has a research career explicitly
focused on the provision of services for autism, while the other two
researchers conduct more basic investigations into autism's neurobiology.
Despite the researchers' backgrounds, the study's "marketing" in the news
media was directly targeted at parents as stakeholders. What interests do
these parents have and how are they promoted or threatened by certain
changes to the DSM category? What interests do other stakeholders have
in the autism revisions, and how do these interests coincide and diverge?
In this section, I review three potential clashes between stakeholders
discussed in the Part II: parents versus school districts, disease advocacy
groups versus insurance companies, and parents versus their children with
autism. In highlighting each of these clashes, I show the interests that are
at stake and the way the DSM stands at the nexus of these different
interests.
1. Parents and School Districts
As discussed, the IDEA grants an individual state the authority to
create its own eligibility criteria for autism special education as long as
this meets or exceeds the minimal requirements set forth in the federal
disability category of "autism."1' Because states are allowed to define
their own criteria for autism-related special education eligibility, there is
significant inter-state variation in the criteria for receiving autism-related
special educational benefits.196 Researchers have documented this
extensive variation, illustrating the some states simply copy the federal
criteria for autism, others copy the DSM-IV-TR criteria, and others use a
193. McPartland, supra note 182, at 370.
194. Karen N. Peart, Autism Redefined: Yale Researchers Study Impact of Proposed Diagnostic Criteria,
YALE NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://news.yale.edul2012/01/20/autism-redefined-yale-
researchers-study-impact-proposed-diagnostic-criteria.
195. Newschaffer, Falb, & Gurney supra note 167 at e280 (discussing how for autism, state special
education eligibility criteria may or may not include higher-functioning children on the autism spectrum).
196. See generally MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 166.
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mix of both.' Furthermore, some states include students with Asperger's
as special education eligible and others do not.' An important distinction
between the federal disability criteria and DSM criteria is that the former
explicitly emphasizes impairment in educational functioning while the
latter does not, yet the prevalence of states that simply copy the DSM
criteria to determine eligibility indicates that many states fail to distinguish
between the two types of diagnostic constructs. Therefore, a change to
DSM restrictiveness is likely to have a reverberating impact on special
education eligibility.
The clash between parents as stakeholders in DSM categories and
school districts' special education service provision is highlighted through
the large amount of litigation filed by parents dissatisfied with their school
district's services. 199 Many courts have ruled that school districts are not
required to provide Applied Behavior Analysis, an expensive therapy for
autism that can cost over $30,000 per year,200 as long as the school covers
an alternative program that gives the child some meaningful benefit.20 '
Despite these less than successful outcomes for parents, the frequency of
autism court cases increased steadily in five-year increments from 1981-
2000.202
Perry Zirkel has examined whether this increase in the frequency of
litigation is merely a byproduct of autism's increased prevalence, or
whether autism occupies a disproportionate amount of special education
litigation relative to the condition's frequency. Zirkel finds that autism
cases account for approximately one-third of court decisions related to
special education, despite autistic students only composing one-tenth of
special education enrollees, and that the proportion of autism cases in
litigation has been markedly higher than the proportion of autistic students
enrolling in special education that same year.203 In explaining this
disproportionality, Zirkel points to the economic costs of providing special
education services for an autistic child and the heterogeneity of children
197. See generally MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 166.
198. MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 166, at 662-669.
199. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Autism Litigation Under the IDEA: A New Meaning of
'Disproportionality?', 24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 92 (2011).
200. See Deanna L. Sharp & Dana L. Baker, Financial Issues Associated with Having a Child with Autism,
28 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES, 247, 251 (2007).
201. See Sheryl Dicker & Emily Bennett, Engulfed by the Spectrum: The Impact of Autism Spectrum
Disorders on Law and Policy, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 415, 426 (2011). Dicker and Bennett argue that the
precedent for the "some meaningful benefit" requirement and other similar cases is the 1982 Supreme
Court's Rowley v. Hendrick, which argued that a school district does not need to "maximize" a child's
learning but instead needs to offer a program that provides the child with some educational benefit.
202. Zirkel, supra note 199, at 93.
203. Id. at 93.
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diagnosed with autism, which creates difficulty in interpreting which
interventions will produce any benefit for a given child.204
Zirkel's research points to two conflicting parental interests in the
construction of the autism diagnostic categories with regards to special
education. First, parents may seek a diagnostic category that is as broad as
possible, for the absence of an autism diagnosis makes it difficult to obtain
special education support due to many states' de facto linking of the two
constructs. Yet the inclusiveness and heterogeneity of the diagnostic
category perhaps impedes more conclusive research into effective autism
interventions. In turn, this scientific uncertainty about the etiology and
treatment for autism may make it more challenging for parents seeking
special education services, since the benefits of many treatments remain
unproven.205 Parents concerns about the contraction of the DSM autism
diagnosis, and the impact of this contraction on their abilities to
successfully pressure school districts to provide expensive special
education services, is one clash of stakeholder interests that the DSM
changes implicate.
2. Disease Advocacy Groups and Insurance Companies
Facing the enormous budgetary burden of providing in-school
services for children with autism, school districts have argued that autism
is a medical rather than education-related disorder and that services should
be conducted out of school and covered through medical insurance. Yet
health care expenditures for children with autism are estimated at between
three to ten times those of other children and insurers have resisted the
burden of responsibility for these expenditures.206 Both private and public
insurers have argued that behavioral therapies for autism are either
experimental or should be a part of special education services.207 insurers'
reluctance to cover autism therapies has brought the industry into contact
with another force affecting DSM development: disease-related advocacy
groups.
204. Id. at 93.
205. Meanwhile, amidst this scientific uncertainty, school districts are straining to provide these services.
For example, one court case estimated the cost of a preschool educational program for a child with autism
at $50,000, which made up one-eighth of the district's entire yearly budget for all students in all preschools
in the district. Zirkel, supra note 199, at 97.
206. See Stacy K. Dymond, Christie L. Gilson, & Steve Myran, Services for Children With Autism
Spectrum Disorders: What Needs to Change? 18 J. DISABIL. POLICY STUD. 133, 142 (discusses how in
interviews with parents of children with autism, the parents describe how insurance companies refuse to
pay for services because the treatment was considered educational in nature rather than medical. Some
parents suggested changing autism's disease designation to a "neurological disorder" rather than a
developmental disorder to increase insurance support for autism services).
207. Dicker & Bennett, supra note 201, at 448-449.
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Autism Speaks is the most prominent autism advocacy group, and
was formed from a merger of the National Alliance for Autism Research
("NAAR") and Cure Autism Now ("CAN") in February of 2005.208 Before
2005, only one state-Indiana-had passed legislation mandating private
insurance coverage for autism services, but from 2007 to the beginning of
2012, twenty-nine additional states passed autism insurance reform laws.209
In addition, Autism Speaks has carefully tracked the DSM revision
process, with official letters from the organization voicing concern that the
proposed revision may discriminate against persons living with autism.210
Following the April publication of Volkmar's results, Autism Speaks
argued that since the findings were worrisome for members of its
organization, it has funded its own study into the proposed DSM changes
to help verify or expand upon the results.21'
Autism Speaks' concern about the diagnostic changes was partially
tied to its success in conflicts with insurance companies over coverage of
autism treatment through its passage of state insurance mandates. The
DSM diagnosis is the tool that the disease advocacy group drew upon in
demands for legislation that mandates insurance coverage for expensive
autism-related services and the legislation often specifically states that the
child must meet the DSM criteria for autism.212 As the DSM revisions
208. Jennifer Singh et al., Trends in US autism research funding, 39 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS 788-95
(2009).
209. See Autism Votes, Autism Speaks State Autism Insurance Reform Initiatives, at
http://www.autismvotes.org/site/c.frKNI3PCImE/b.3909861/k.B9DF/State_Initiatives.htm. However, these
mandates may not cover a substantial portion of persons with private insurance due to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1973, which exempts self-insured plans from state insurance
benefits legislation. Though the amount of firms within a state that self-insures varies by area, the Kaiser
Family Foundation estimated in 2000 that between 33% and 50% of employees in the U.S. are exempt from
state-level mandates due to 1974's Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See Susan H. Busch &
Colleen L. Barry, New Evidence on the Effects of State Mental Health Mandates, 45 Inquiry 308, 311
(2008). At the federal level, the passage of the Affordable Care Act and the Department of Health and
Human Services' recent announcement has led to new advocacy efforts. HHS granted individual states the
authority to define their own essential health benefits ("EHB") using one of four benchmark plan types,
which has led Autism Speaks and its sister organization, Autism Votes, to focus lobbying efforts on
ensuring that expensive behavioral health treatments for autism will be included within states' EHB
definitions. See Letter from Mike Doyle, U.S. Congressman, to Kathleen Sebelius, Jan. 12, 2012, available
at http://doyle.house.gov/2012%2001 %2012%20ABA%20Coverage%20to%20HHS%20vert.pdf.
210. AUTISM SPEAKS, Autism Speaks Statement on Proposed Revisions to the DSM Definition of Autism
Spectrum Disorder (Feb. 2, 2012), at http://www.autismspeaks.org/science/policy-statements/statement-
revisions-dsm-definition-autism-spectrum-disorder
211. Autism Speaks pointed out that Volkmar's study only analyzed clinical data, while their newly-
funded study will also look at community prevalence rates.
212. For example, Connecticut's statute specifies that it applies that "autism spectrum disorders," "means
the pervasive developmental disorders set forth in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric
Association's 'Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,' including, but not limited to,
Autistic Disorder, Rett's Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Asperger's Disorder and Pervasive
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified." See An Act Concerning Health Insurance Coverage For
Autism Spectrum Disorders, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514b (as amended by S.B. 301 (2009)).
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threatened to reduce the number of persons who met the diagnosis of
autism, it also threatened the political work of disease advocacy groups in
successfully mandating certain forms of insurance coverage for the
disorder.
3. Parents and Children
The proposed changes and possibly exclusion of persons with
Asperger's from the spectrum has also highlighted clashes between the
patients and their parents. Autism Speak's website features a story, "Mixed
Emotions," showcasing the mixed reactions to the proposed DSM changes.
Wills, a 14-year-old with Asperger's, says that to be considered "not
autistic, simply overjoys me."213 He describes, "When I saw Brian
Williams say that 'Aspergers might not be considered autism,' I jumped
for joy along with everyone with Aspergers, I assume."2 14 Yet others with
Asperger's were less overjoyed, calling the proposed changes "unfairly
stringent" and mourning the loss of the "pride of self-identity" within the
Asperger's community.21 5 These patients argued that the identity has
"definite value" in creating a community, regardless of whether or not the
diagnosis aids in service provision.2 16
Meanwhile, the response from parents appears far less equivocal, at
least as revealed in statements to media outlets and in blog posts.1 Wills'
mother was far from overjoyed at the changes, describing the proposed
category as "heartbreaking." She argues that if the category had been
restricted when Wills was younger, "he would not have received the
services that have been instrumental in his improvement ... . My worry is
that children like Wills will no longer be eligible for the services he
received-the very services that gave him a chance at living his life as a
relaxed person, fully integrated into society."218 In these instances, we see
the different interpretations of the DSM category between patients versus
their caregivers. Patients are often focused on the DSM diagnosis as an
identity that is either stigmatizing or provides an entr6e into a welcome
213. Monica Halloway, A Mother's and Son Response to the DSM-5 Change, AUTISM SPEAKS BLOG (Feb.
2, 2012), at http://blog.autismspeaks.org/2012/02/02/mixed-emotions-a-mother-and-son-response-to-the-
DSM-5-change/.
214. Id.
215. Dania Jekel, Letter To The AANE Asperger Community In Response To The Recent DSM-5 News,
ASPERGER'S ASSOC. OF NEW ENGLAND, available at
http://www.aane.org/about-asperger syndrome/dsm5_1etter.html
216. Jean W. Gardner, Revised DSM Criteria for Autism Raises Questions, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2011), at
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/autism-unexpected/2011 /jan/29/revised-DSM-
criteria-autism-raise-questions/.
217. This is admittedly a self-selecting sample.
218. Halloway, supra note 213.
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community. In contrast, parents are more explicitly focused on the
economic burden of treatment for the condition and anxiety about the loss
of service provision.
This conflict can manifest itself not only in response to the diagnostic
changes themselves, but to areas of service provision that the changes
impact. For example, although special education litigation often assumes
that the parents' preferences for an IEP represent the best interests of the
child,2 19 especially for IEPs that involve conspicuous alteration of activities
or placement in a different classroom setting, children with autism may
resent the IEP services that hinge on their diagnosis while parents may
welcome these services. In this sense, the autism case study illustrates the
way in which parental and child interests with respect to psychiatric
diagnostic changes can diverge.
C. The APA's Avoidance of "Pragmatic" Concerns
Just as those within the "Aspie" community remain divided on the
proposed changes, the study on the change's potential impact on
prevalence rates has created public polarization within the autism clinician
and researcher community. The journal that published the Volkmar study
also published a defense of the proposed changes from the DSM
Neurodevelopmental Disorders Work Group. In a commentary, the Work
Group condemns the "attention-getting media" that preceded the study's
publication and criticized the study itself as suffering from serious
methodological flaws.220
The DSM Work Group pointedly rebutted the accusation that the
change to autism's criteria was motivated by a desire to reduce inflated
prevalence statistics, instead arguing that the new criteria would lead to an
increase in the identified prevalence of autism among girls and racial and
ethnic minorities.22 ' The commentary emphasized the amount of time
219. See Ralph D. Mawdsley and Jacqueline J. Cumming, Students'Rights and Parents'Rights: A United
States Perspective of the Emerging Conflict Between Them and the Implications for Education, 10
AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND J. OF L & EDUC. 19, 25 (2005) (arguing that courts tend to assume that
parents represent the best interests of their children during special education meetings and litigation).
220. Susan Swedo et al., Commentary from the DSM-5 Workgroup on Neurodevelopmental Disorders, 5 1
J.ACAD.CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, 347 (2012). The authors argue that it is methodologically
unsound to take an archival sample from the DSM-IV field trials and attempt to apply the new diagnostic
criteria to this sample. Furthermore, they argue that the researchers falsely elevate the DSM-IV criteria to a
"gold standard" of diagnosis, ignoring the criteria's issues in diagnosing persons outside the 5 to 8-year old
age range.
221. Id at 348 (arguing that the DSM-IV autism criteria "demonstrated deficits in their ability to
accurately identify girls and women with autism and lacked the cultural sensitivity needed to identify cases
in ethnic or racial minorities." The Work Group also argued that one of their chief questions when revision
the criteria was whether they were "accidentally excluding any patients," highlighting that the Work Group
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devoted to constructing the criteria, five years and 6,000 hours of in-
person meetings and teleconferences, and contended that all the
deliberations were guided by the Hippocratic clinician interest I discussed
in the previous section. The changes are rooted in, "our clinical mandate to
'first do no harm,' so that every decision was considered from multiple
perspectives to determine: 'how will this decision impact individuals with
ASD? 'Are we accidentally excluding any patients?' And 'Have we
ensured that the change is an improvement over DSM-5?"'22 2 The Work
Group members maintained that their most important question was, "Have
we succeeded in accurately capturing all individuals with ASD with the
diagnostic criteria proposed for DSM-5?" 223 Thus, the APA's commentary
deliberately emphasizes the clinical benefit of the new diagnosis rather
than the benefits for systematic research investigations into the disorder's
etiology and treatment.
The Work Group's explicit framing of the changes as guided by the
organization's clinical mission guiding the changes rather than the desire
to construct a more scientifically valid category is somewhat unexpected
and differs from the APA's framing of the changes in other contexts. In
other forums and publications, the changes have often been justified with
reference to both clinical and scientific concerns. For example, the Work
Group's website stated that one (out of two) rationale for the changes is
that a single spectrum disorder is a "better reflection of the state of
knowledge about pathology." 2 4 This state of knowledge includes a meta-
analysis showing differences in gray matter volume in autistic spectrum
patients when compared to healthy controls, but no differences between
patients within the spectrum diagnosed with autism versus Asperger's.225
Another meta-analysis, reviewing twenty-four studies, showed the lack of
distinction between patients with autism and patients with Asperger's in
terms of familial transmission, executive functioning, and language
was not trying to reduce the identified prevalence of autism but to make the autism diagnosis better suited
to the symptom profile of a more diverse range of patients).
222. Id. at 348.
223. Id. at 348.
224. The original rationale was published under the title. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, A 09 Autism Spectrum
Disorder: Rationale (2012), at
http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=94#. However, following the
public commenting period, the Work Group's rationale was removed from the DSM-5 website. A summary
and explanation of this now electronically-inaccessible rationale can be found at Natalie Berger, Proposed
DSM-5 Changes to Autism Spectrum Disorders Diagnosis (2012), at
http://www.macmhb.org/CWaiver_2012/Handouts/32%20DSM5%20Changes%2Oto%20ASD%20Diagno
sis.pdf.
225. See generally Esther Via et al., Meta-Analysis Of Gray Matter Abnormalities In Autism Spectrum
Disorder: Should Asperger Disorder Be Subsumed Under A Broader Umbrella Of Autistic Spectrum
Disorder?, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 409, 409-418 (2011).
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ability.226 The Work Group, by drawing on the clinical language of the
Hippocratic oath rather than the empirical language of these meta-analyses
in its public attempts to quell outcry over proposed changes, deliberately
presents the DSM changes as motivated by concern for helping the patient
improve. The group aligns itself with parents concerned with recovery
rather than researchers seeking a better DSM reflection of the current state
of autism research.
The task force's commentary illustrates the malleability of "patient
benefit" in the hands of different stakeholders. Volkmar and parent
advocacy groups define patient benefit in terms of diagnoses that err on
the side of inclusivity, linking patient benefit to insurance reimbursement
and special education eligibility. "Higher-functioning" patients who may
be excluded from a diagnosis under the new criteria are bitterly divided;
some construe "patient benefit" as the escape from a stigmatizing DSM
label while others welcome this label for the identity it provides and the
community it creates. Members of the APA publicize different notions of
"patient benefit" in different forums; in some public statements, the APA
defines "patient benefit" with sole reference to improved clinical
outcomes; in other public statements, the APA also references the
importance of diagnostic constructs better reflecting the scientific
consensus about the lack of an empirically-based distinction between the
three autistic disorders.
IV. GOING FORWARD: TOWARD A MORE "IMPURE"
MANUAL
At first glance, these distinct definitions of "patient benefit" appear
incommensurable. How can a DSM that is appropriated for such a
heterogeneous array of stakeholder aims mediate between the inevitable
conflicts that arise? In this section, I suggest two improvements to the
process of DSM development. Each of these improvements is aimed at
acknowledging the social forces that shape the DSM, while preventing
these forces from overwhelming the ianual's focus on diagnostic criteria
useful for clinicians.
A. Diversity and Representation
The first suggestion is for a more explicit acknowledgment of what I
referred to in the introduction as the DSM's "impurity": the influence of
226. See generally Andrea N. Witwer & Luc Lecavalier, Examining The Validity Of Autism Spectrum
Disorder Subtypes, 38 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORDERS, 1611, 1611-24 (2008).
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economic, social, and other non-clinical forces on the manual and the way
in which the manual is used in a diverse array of non-clinical contexts.
While the APA's overarching priority during the development process
should be on the manual's clinical utility, there is one small step the APA
can take to acknowledge these other contexts: create more diverse DSM
Work Groups. Though the APA is a professional organization largely
composed of psychiatrists and some clinical psychologists, the manual has
clearly evolved beyond its status as a niche, professional publication solely
used by this narrow demographic. While the Work Groups should remain
largely composed of APA members, for disorders that are especially
salient to legal proceedings or educational outcomes, the Work Group
should contain members who are representative of these interests. For
example, paraphilic disorders and personality disorders are often
referenced in legal proceedings. A Work Group's inclusion of a lawyer
trained to dissect how the precise wording of a diagnosis may be used in
litigation can help avoid costly errors such as the DSM-IV's harmful
change to the wording of sexual disorders. Similarly; the Work Groups for
developmental disorders that are referenced in the provision of special
education benefits should include lawyers or education policy analysts
familiar with the aims of the IDEA and litigation advancing those aims.227
My proposal to expand Work Groups to include one to two
representatives who are aware of certain non-clinical impacts of DSM
revisions faces three challenges. First is that because psychiatrists who
view the diagnostic changes in light of their clinical and research impacts
will outnumber other representatives, the perspectives of these other
representatives may not prevail over the research and clinical perspectives
in the case of conflict. While this challenge is valid, I argue that the DSM,
as a document that is used first and foremost to guide clinical practice,
should give greater weight to psychiatrist perspectives. Furthermore, there
are likely to be cases where the perspective of a non-psychiatrist-for
example, an education policy analyst commenting on special education
uses of a DSM developmental disorder-will align with the clinician's
interest in improving patient suffering and will thus provide additional
insight into category construction rather than a perspective that sharply
dissents from that of a clinician-researcher. The second challenge is the
risk that stakeholder participation will be "tokenistic" rather than
substantive, with persons being included in name but marginalized in the
227. In addition, I am purposely excluding private sector agents from inclusion on the Work Groups
because of the ways in which their obligations to their shareholders may conflict with their obligations to
improve patient benefit.
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discussion and revision process. While this implementation challenge is
valid, it seems premature to argue that because these other representatives
may face difficulty having their perspectives incorporated into revision
outcomes, that these representatives should not be included at all. Instead,
representatives should be included with efforts at encouraging a
substantive rather than tokenistic contribution. The third challenge is that
the psychiatrist members of the APA may view the inclusion of other
perspectives as a threat to their professional and/or scientific legitimacy; in
other words, it may challenge psychiatrists' views of themselves as the
type of professional with the knowledge and the authority to address
mental illness. However, my proposal explicitly aims to include
professionals who add insight into uses of DSM diagnoses that do not fall
under psychiatry's professional purview, such as legal perspectives about
how changes will be interpreted in the adversarial setting of criminal
prosecution or educational perspectives about the use of diagnoses in
special education. Therefore, the inclusion of these other perspectives
seems to supplement rather than challenge psychiatry's professional and
scientific legitimacy.
With these challenges in mind, I maintain that the APA should move
forward from its current Work Groups, fairly homogeneously composed of
well-respected psychiatric researchers and researcher-clinicians, to at least
some inclusion of other professional perspectives. Since patient outcomes
for DSM categories such as sexual and developmental disorders are often
tied to non-clinical interests and contexts (legal proceedings, special
education eligibility), the task force's interest in "clinical utility" and
patient well-being supports the modest inclusion of these perspectives.
B. Publicity of Reasons
The second improvement to the DSM revision process would, be
better articulation by the task force of how carefully constructed diagnoses
are likely in the patients' long-term interests. The controversy over the
possible restriction of the autism diagnosis illustrates that many patients
and patient advocacy groups are often fixated on the short-term
ramifications of diagnostic changes. Families are rightfully worried about
the immediate financial impact of "losing" a diagnosis, but less concerned
with the long-term viability of research into the pathology of a given
disorder. While some research may never translate into improved clinical
outcomes, other research will ultimately lead to better treatment for
patients, though this translation is certainly far from immediate. Many
patient advocates have vilified the task force for "restricting" the autism
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diagnostic category, yet few have stopped to ask whether the vagueness
and inconsistency of the current diagnostic category has impeded
researchers' search for more effective therapeutic interventions. Though it
may be unrealistic to persuade patients and other stakeholders to postpone
their short-term anxieties about diagnostic changes for the sake of far-off
and uncertain improvements in research, the task force should try to
publicly articulate the importance of these long-term aims for better
treatment for existing and future generations. Publicity of the reasons
behind DSM decisions-in other words, opening up the "black box" of
deliberation about proposed revisions-can have two effects. First, forcing
Work Groups to publicize their rationales for changes can increase their
motivation to root these changes in reasons that patients and the public
find justifiable. Second, those who rely on the manual and its categories
for various social services can understand the theoretical and long-term
motivations behind manual changes.
The revision process for the DSM-5, which debuted on May 17,
2013, the APA appears to be taking two important steps that begin to
incorporate my suggested improvements. First, the creation of a public
commenting period allows some degree of diversity in influence on the
manual if not at the influential level of Work Group membership. Second,
the online publication of the rationale for the proposed changes to the
manual has led to open critique and debate about whether the changes are
made for reasons that are acceptable to those affected, such as the debates
over the rationale for changes to the autism category and debates about
whether the proposed inclusion of a risk syndrome for schizophrenia was
driven by adequate scientific support for schizophrenia prevention or by
pharmaceutical marketing interests. To improve this process of publicizing
reasons for changes and incorporating feedback in future revisions, the
DSM should increase the transparency of the public commenting process
even further. During the DSM-5's public commenting process, there was
no public record of the comments submitted and no publicly available
statements or transcripts of how a Work Group incorporated a given set of
comments. To improve the transparency of this public commenting
process, the APA could borrow some of the methods used in the notice
and comment step of federal agencies' rule-making process.228 When the
public offers comments on a proposed rule by a federal agency, these
comments are made publicly available so that persons can analyze the
228. For a description of this process, see Susan W. Yackee, Sweet-talking the Fourth Branch: The
Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUBL. ADM. RES. THEOR. 103,
104 (2005) (describing how during the notice and comment period of federal agency rulemaking, any
individual or group can provide written comments regarding an agency's proposed rule).
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effect the public comments had, if any, on the final outcome of the
proposed rule. 229 The APA has taken the first step of soliciting public
comments. For future revisions, it should make this process more robust
and allow public access to the submitted comments so persons can
measure the impact of these comments on the outcome of DSM revisions.
Despite this limitation, part I has highlighted the DSM's pronounced
shift from its original, closed-doors gestation. Its framers have begun to
incorporate elements of inclusivity and accountability that are necessary
for the manual's continued legitimacy among its many diverse
stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
The APA has begun to realize that the DSM is far from a "pure"
document that ought to be shielded from social scrutiny by the general
public and other stakeholders. Inclusion of a more heterogeneous array of
stakeholders in the manual's revision process coupled with a reiteration of
the manual's long-term aims, are important steps in the evolution of the
DSM's self-depiction. The DSM is no longer thought of as a document
handed down from scientific forces to the general public every five to
thirteen years, representing a "victory of science over ideology." 230 Instead,
the APA is beginning to open up its categories to public scrutiny and
critique, a move that has spawned public criticism of many proposed
revisions but that arguably leads to greater public legitimacy for changes
to the DSM.
As the DSM continues to evolve, it remains to be seen whether the
manual can accommodate the diversity of interests discussed in this article
or whether the manual will cede ground to new systems of classification
that are more closely tailored to the needs of different stakeholders. For
example, the National Institutes of Mental Health has begun a project on
"Research domain criteria" ("RDoC"), which will enable researchers to
investigate broad constructs such as fear response or executive control
rather than constraining themselves to a single DSM diagnosis.23 ' Will
these criteria have a reverberating impact across multiple contexts-for
example, the emergence of expert testimony about a defendant's RDoC
impulsivity rating rather than his or her DSM antisocial personality
229. For an example of this scholarly analysis of how public comments impacted the outcome of a
proposed agency rule, see Id. at 112-113.
230. Sabshin, supra note 64, at 1272.
231. See generally Thomas Insel et al., Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): Toward a New Classification
Frameworkfor Research on Mental Disorders, 167 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 748-751 (2010).
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disorder diagnosis-and therefore face similar issues as the current DSM?
The answer to this question remains to be seen. In this article, however, I
have highlighted the importance of inquiring into these "impure"
applications of the DSM.

